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DO STATE LEGISLATURES HAVE A ROLE IN
RESOLVING THE "JUST COMPENSATION"
DILEMMA? SOME LESSONS FROM
PUBLIC CHOICE AND POSITIVE
POLITICAL THEORY
Marilyn F. Drees*
INTRODUCTION
r~rHE final clause of the Fifth Amendment admonishes: "nor shall
X private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."1 This Just Compensation Clause provides an outer boundary of
private property regulation by government at all levels. Recently, the
Fifth Amendment's allure as a weapon to protect private property
against government regulation has spread among the general public.
The protection of endangered species' habitats, the preservation of
wetlands, the limitations on development for flood and erosion con-
trol, to name a few obvious examples, have upset traditional notions
of what a landowner could do with his land. A steady constriction of
the range of uses permitted landowners, especially owners of environ-
mentally sensitive land, coupled with expansion of the complex bu-
reaucratic procedures to obtain permission to develop land, have
fueled intense resentment among affected owners.2 The current surge
* Assistant Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. B.A., University
of Alabama, 1981; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1984. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges research support from Dean Kenneth C. Randall and the University of Ala-
bama Law School Foundation, as well as diligent research assistance by Jason Pierce,
Sarah Ames, Matt Franklin, Kimberly Staggs, Pete Bond, and Will McCarty. Ms.
Dana Harris of Defenders of Property Rights, Inc., also provided exceptional help
with state legislation. Finally, thanks to Professors Bill Brewbaker, John Dzienkow-
ski, Norman Stein, Bill Andreen, Bryan Fair, Wythe Holt, and Pam Bucy for thought-
ful comments on previous drafts.
1. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court made the amendment binding on
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Chicago Burlington & Quincy Rail-
way v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906). For convenience, this portion of the Fifth Amend-
ment will be referred to in this article as the "Just Compensation Clause" or simply
the "Fifth Amendment."
2. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida's Property Rights Act: A Political Quick FUx
Results in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 327-31 (1996); David
Foster, Property Rights Soars to New Heights, Chi. Trib., Aug. 19, 1995, § 4 (Home
Guide) at 1, 2 ("'The whole property-rights movement is a backlash to being sat on
for too long by the government,' Alan Riggs says." Riggs was arrested for failing to
preserve properly a bald eagle habitat on his lot.): Bill Lambrecht, Florida's Property
Rights Law, Born of Fear, Worries Officials, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 9, 1995, at
6A (describing property rights laws as arising from antigovernment sentiment). In
explaining state and federal legislative interest in private property protection, Sen.
Larry Craig (R-Idaho) said, "We're not out to pillage the environment, but what
we're seeing now is environmental extremism. What we'll be talking about is moving
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of protectionism toward private property is largely a response to the
expansion and enforcement of land use regulations.3 Large and small
landowners commonly raise a Fifth Amendment "regulatory taking"
objection when a federal, state, or local law or rule has impinged on
their ability to use their land.4
Since its adoption, the Fifth Amendment has been universally ap-
plied to physical invasions or appropriations of land by the govern-
ment.5 Seventy-five years ago, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
the Supreme Court recognized that a regulation that went "too far"
would constitute a taking.6 Since then, however, the Court has made
minimal progress in demarcating the distance that would be "too far."
Instead, the Court has offered a shifting array of factors and catego-
ries derived from fact-intensive analyses, making it difficult to predict
the outcome of a given case.7 Perhaps impatient with the lack of pro-
tection afforded by the courts,8 many state legislatures have passed
legislation that mandates explicit consideration of the impact of regu-
lations on private property. 9 These statutes, and the debates sur-
the pendulum back to the center." 'Nightmare on Main Street'? GOP to Push Prop-
erty Rights, Ariz. Repub., Dec. 11, 1994, at B7.
3. Foster, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the huge regulatory regime, especially
environmental rules, has landowners "screaming for help"); Stefanie Scott, Lengthy
Shakeout Expected on Regulatory Takings Law, San Antonio Express-News, Sept. 8,
1995, available at 1995 WL 9501255 (stating that the Texas compensation law grew
from opposition to a proposal to designate a habitat for endangered golden-cheeked
warbler); Steve Yozwiak, Prop. 300 Rejected; Trap Ban Approved, No Raise for
Lawmakers, Ariz. Repub., Nov. 9, 1994, at A12 ("Conservatives nationwide have
used the property-rights issue to challenge environmental regulations.").
4. "Regulatory taking(s)" will be used in this article to describe the concept that
a regulation is sufficiently restrictive to give rise to a right of compensation for an
owner whose land is affected by the regulation.
5. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 798 (1995).
6. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
7. Most modern commentators on the Just Compensation Clause begin or end
with a discussion of the Supreme Court's confusing treatment of private property. See,
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Do-
main ix-x (1985); Gregory S. Alexander, Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of
Property, 9 Const. Commentary 259, 259-60 (1992); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the
Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 147 (1995);
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L.J. 1077, 1081 (1990); Laura
S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 Can. J.L. & Juris. 161,
165-67 (1996).
8. Uncertainty caused by the murkiness of regulatory takings jurisprudence and
impatience with the slow pace of legal developments in the courts probably added
motivation for the legislative movement. Scott Allen, Land Grab: Property Rights
Challenges are Raising the Ante in Environmental Protection, Boston Globe, Dec. 11,
1995, at 29, 31 ("Jerold Kayden, a professor in the graduate school of design at
Harvard University, argues that the property rights movement turned to politics pri-
marily because it has not made progress with thecourts.").
9. The question of the propriety of state versus federal legislation raises complex
and substantial federalism concerns that are beyond the scope of this article. As a
practical matter, issues concerning the role of state legislatures are more pressing,
[Vol. 66
"JUST COMPENSATION" DILEMMA
rounding them, have brought into sharper focus the fundamental
question of whether courts can, or should, solve the regulatory takings
puzzle alone.
This new legislative interest shifts the focus of the regulatory tak-
ings question from the best way for judges to decide the question to
whether judges should decide the question. Much analysis of regula-
tory takings takes the view that a choice must be made between the
legislature and the judiciary. This article, using lessons from public
choice and positive political theory, suggests that a better focus would
be to determine whether the work of two institutions produces a bet-
ter result than the work of one; the efforts of the legislature can com-
plement those of the courts to produce a clear, fair resolution of the
just compensation dilemma. Part I of this article traces modern Just
Compensation Clause jurisprudence. Part II offers an overview of the
recent state legislation, along with a brief consideration of the reasons
for which the regulatory takings question is a matter for the states.
Part Ill discusses the difficulty of choosing the appropriate deci-
sionmaker for property rights issues, first summarizing the prevalent
theories of institutional choice, loosely gathered under the headings of
public choice and positive political theory, then suggesting a variant
institutional choice analysis. This variant is based not on the choice
between institutions, but rather on the choice of the sequence of insti-
tutional decisions. The alternative analysis yields a more sensible ana-
lytical approach to property rights protection. Part IV offers guidance
for state legislatures in structuring statutes to comport with the core
notion of fairness that underlies the Fifth Amendment and to provide
greater clarity and certainty for landowners and government officials.
I. FIFrH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Early Supreme Court Treatment: From Pennsylvania Coal to
Penn Central
Pennsylvania Coal established the foundation" for the proposition
that a law or regulation could violate the Just Compensation Clause
simply because of limitations it placed on an owner's use of his prop-
since twenty-five states have passed some sort of property rights laws. The United
States Congress has considered property rights legislation, but has never passed any.
Late last May, Sen. Orrin Hatch introduced S. 781, a comprehensive property rights
bill virtually identical to the one introduced by then Sen. Dole in the 104th Congress,
S. 605. See S. 781, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995). S. 781 was referred
to the Judiciary Committee and one hearing has been held so far, in October 1997.
For a detailed critique of S. 605, see Frank I. Michelman, Testimony Before the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, June 27, 1995, 49 Wash. U. J. Urb. &
Contemp. L. 1 (1996).
10. But see Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record
Straight, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 1211 (arguing that regulatory takings were recognized in
the nineteenth century, well before Pennsylvania Coal).
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erty.11 The case involved an injunction sought by the Mahons to pre-
vent the coal company's mining activities under their home. They
relied on the Kohler Act, passed by the Pennsylvania legislature in
1921. The Kohler Act prohibited mining activities that would cause
sinking of homes, commercial buildings, public buildings or streets, or
other public facilities.' 2 The company argued that the Kohler Act de-
prived it of property, specifically the coal in the "support estate," a
separate estate recognized by Pennsylvania law in the pillars of coal
that supported the surface. 3 Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
agreed that the Kohler Act violated the Fifth Amendment. He ad-
vanced a number of criteria which could be considered in determining
the existence of a Fifth Amendment violation. Conceding that
"[g]overnment could hardly go on" if payment was required for every
change in the law that affected property, Holmes nevertheless noted
that when diminution of value "reache[d] a certain magnitude, in most
if not in all cases there must be... compensation to sustain the act.' 4
According to Holmes, the outcome would depend on specific facts in
a case, one of which would be the extent of diminution of value. 15
Holmes also characterized the case as concerning "a single private
house," which did not sufficiently affect the public interest to warrant
the destruction of the company's rights in the support estate. 6 In dis-
tinguishing a previous Pennsylvania case, which required companies
with adjoining mines to leave pillars of coal along property lines to
avoid mine cave-ins, Holmes pointed out that the burden secured "an
average reciprocity of advantage" for the companies and their em-
11. Before 1926, the Court had already considered a number of cases involving
absolute prohibition of certain activities and had upheld them as valid exercises of
police power. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of
brick kiln operation in specified zone); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171
(1915) (prohibition of livery stable in downtown area); L'Hote v. City of New Orle-
ans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900) (regulation of prostitution); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887) (state statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages);
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (prohibition of fertilizer operations).
Many of these cases were based on the Fourteenth Amendment protection against
deprivation of property without due process of law; indeed, several were decided
before the Supreme Court "incorporated" the Fifth Amendment in 1906. See supra
note 1. The police power analysis continues to be an important part of Fifth Amend-
ment analysis, however, and these cases helped foster the presumption that nuisances
or activities with attributes of nuisance could be severely restricted or even outlawed
by the government with impunity.
As this footnote indicates, this part does not purport to be an encyclopedic recapit-
ulation of every property deprivation claim ever considered by the Court. Instead, it
highlights the cases that have proven important in the regulatory takings debate.
12. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416-17, 421-22 (1922) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 414.
14. Id. at 413.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 413-14.
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ployees which could justify the restriction on mining." Holmes con-
cluded by reiterating that the issue of when a regulation goes "too
far"' 8 and becomes a taking "is a question of degree-and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions.""
After sketching the contours of the new regulatory takings analysis,
the Supreme Court fell silent for four years, until it considered a Fifth
Amendment challenge to a comprehensive zoning scheme in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.2" Ambler Realty sought invalidation
of the city's entire zoning ordinance, claiming that the imposition of
the zoning ordinance reduced the value of its property by at least two-
thirds.2' Justice Sutherland's majority opinion cautioned that "[t]he
line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate
assumption of [police] power is not capable of precise delimitation. It
varies with circumstances and conditions."' The Court sustained the
segregation of commercial and residential uses in different zones, find-
ing that the creation of exclusively residential zones was rationally re-
lated to public health and safety, and reducing traffic, noise,
congestion, and other nuisance-like byproducts of intense commercial
use.
23
In 1928, the Court again considered a zoning challenge in Nectow v.
City of Cambridge.24 Unlike Ambler Realty in the previous case,
Nectow conceded the general validity of the ordinance but specifically
challenged the inclusion of his property in a residential zone. This
time, the Supreme Court relied on the specific factual findings of the
court-appointed master that the city's choice of the zoning boundary
was not substantially related to public health, safety, or welfare. ' In
the absence of a valid exercise of police power, the Court held the
ordinance unconstitutional as applied to Nectow's property.2
After its contrasting opinions on zoning, the Court did not take up
the regulation of real property again for nearly half a century. Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City concerned the constitu-
tionality of New York's historic preservation ordinance.27 It offered a
modem synthesis of the fact-specific, multifactor analyses gleaned
from the late 19th and early 20th century cases. In Penn Central, the
Court conceded early that defining "'taking' for purposes of the Fifth
17. Id. at 415.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 416.
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. Id. at 384.
22. Id. at 387.
23. Id. at 394-95.
24. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
25. Id. at 187-88.
26. Id. at 188-89.
27. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. '2 8
Justice Brennan's majority opinion identified three factors that had
come to be important in "these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries":
(1) economic impact, notably interference with "distinct investment-
backed expectations"; (2) character of the action (i.e., physical inva-
sion versus general or specific regulation); and (3) advancement of
public health, safety, and welfare.29 The Penn Central majority also
carried forward the tradition of deference to state and local
lawmakers in analyzing the purposes and effects of the law.30 Because
the preservation law advanced public health and welfare,31 did not de-
prive Penn Central completely of the use of its property or the air-
space above it,32 and did not uniquely burden property owners like
Penn Central without any compensating benefit, 33 the preservation or-
dinance was sustained.34
B. The Modern Muddle35
The next fifteen years saw a variety of analytical frameworks used
with a concomitant variety of outcomes. In 1979, for example, the
Court reached two opposite results in a week. First, in Andrus v. Al-
lard,36 Justice Brennan, the author of Penn Central, wrote for a nearly
unanimous court37 that the federal law and regulations prohibiting the
sale of eagles and eagle parts did not violate the Just Compensation
Clause.38 Although the law admittedly deprived owners of the most
profitable use of their property, the sale of eagles and products made
with eagle feathers, they were otherwise fully able to keep or dispose
of the property.39 The elimination of one stick in the property rights
bundle of sticks was not sufficient to prove a taking; the bundle must
be viewed in the aggregate.40
Seven days later, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,4' Justice Rehn-
quist found the deprivation of a single stick-the right to exclude
others-to be sufficient to trigger the Just Compensation Clause.42
The Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers could not, without
28. Id. at 123.
29. Id. at 124-25.
30. Id. at 125-27.
31. Id. at 129.
32. Id. at 130-31.
33. Id. at 134-35.
34. Id. at 138.
35. See Rose, supra note 7, at 561.
36. 444 U.S. 51 (1979). The decision date was Nov. 27, 1979.
37. The decision was unanimous, but the opinion was not because Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the judgment. Id. at 68.
38. Id. at 67-68.
39. Id. at 66.
40. Id. at 65-66.
41. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The decision date was December 4, 1979.
42. Id. at 179-80.
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compensation, compel the owners of a private marina, who had
dredged a channel to connect the marina to a public waterway, to
open the marina to the public.43
In 1980, the Court revisited the "ad hoc" analysis of Penn Central
and its predecessors in Agins v. City of Tiburon.' The Agins decision
retained the fact-specific balancing of public interest and private bur-
den,45 but appeared to telescope all the various factors and considera-
tions into a two part test; a taking would occur if a law "[did] not
substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or denie[d] an
owner economically viable use of his land .... ."I'
The next major development occurred in 1982, when the Court
broke from its case-by-case, fact-by-fact formula to announce a cate-
gory of per se taking: "permanent physical occupation."47 In Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court declared unconsti-
tutional a New York law that prohibited a landlord from (1) stopping
the installation of cables for cable television on his apartment building
roof or (2) collecting from the cable companies any fee in excess of
the amount set by a state commission. 48 According to the Court, the
installation of cables and cable boxes on an apartment building roof
was a "permanent physical occupation of property," which had always
been characterized as a taking.49
The dissatisfaction xvith judicial deference to lawmakers and regula-
tors which had bubbled up in Kaiser Aetna and simmered in several
previous dissents came to the fore in 1987. Although the Court, in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,50 followed the
Penn Central multifactor balancing analysis to sustain a Pennsylvania
statute limiting coal mining to prevent subsidence, Justice Stevens'
opinion drew a stinging dissent from Chief Justice Rehnquist and
three colleagues.5' Rehnquist complained that the majority deferred
too much to the legislature and did not examine thoroughly whether
the claimed public purpose of the law was sufficient to avoid compen-
sation.52 In addition, Rehnquist criticized the majority for reading the
early "prohibition of nuisance" cases too broadly, while paying inade-
quate attention to the total destruction of the coal company's property
interest in the support estate.53
43. Id. at 178-80.
44. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
45. Id. at 261.
46. Id. at 260.
47. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,421 (1982). In
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), the Court specifically limited Loreuo's
per se rule to physical invasions of property. Id. at 538-39.
48. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423 n.3.
49. Id. at 441.
50. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
51. Id. at 506.
52. Id. at 510-11 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
53. Id. at 511-15 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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Rehnquist wrote again, this time for the majority, in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.54 Although it
did not revise the regulatory takings test, the opinion was highly sig-
nificant because of the holding that compensation was a required rem-
edy under the Fifth Amendment, even for temporary regulatory
takings." If a regulation was invalidated as a taking, the owner was
entitled to compensation for the period of time before invalidation
when it was enforced against him. 6
Justice Scalia tightened the first prong of the Agins test in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission57 by requiring that a condition im-
posed on a building permit could not be considered to "substantially
advance[ ] legitimate state interests ' 58 unless there was a clear
"nexus" between the condition imposed and the asserted state inter-
est.59 A few years later, Justice Rehnquist attempted to clarify the
scope of that required nexus in Dolan v. City of Tigard.6" According
to Rehnquist, the burden was on the government to make an "individ-
ualized determination" demonstrating a "rough proportionality" be-
tween the government's requirement and the impact of the owner's
proposed project.61 The proof would not require "precise mathemati-
cal calculation," but something more rigorous than a conclusory state-
ment about the possible effects of the project was needed.62
Justice Scalia's other notable contribution to takings jurisprudence
came in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.63 In Lucas, Mr. Lu-
cas claimed, the trial court found, and Scalia's majority opinion ac-
cepted without quibble, that he was deprived of all economically
beneficial use of his property when the Coastal Council designated it
as part of an erosion area in which building was prohibited.'M Scalia
explained65 that the deprivation of all economically beneficial use was
not just the second prong of the Agins analysis, but an independent
category of takings per se.66 Unless the government could prove that
its restrictions on use "inhere[d] in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership," any law that deprived an owner
54. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
55. Id. at 318.
56. Id. at 322.
57. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
58. Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
59. Id. at 836-37.
60. 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994).
61. Id. at 391.
62. Id. at 395-96.
63. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
64. Id. at 1020.
65. According to Justice Blackmun, Justice Scalia actually created a per se cate-
gory that was not recognized in Agins. See id. at 1046-47 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
66. Id. at 1015-16.
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of all economically beneficial use would violate the Fifth
Amendment.67
After nearly a century of efforts to define regulatory takings, the
Court has laid a remarkably unsteady foundation. One noncontrover-
sial per se rule has emerged: a law or regulation permitting a physical
invasion of property violates the Fifth Amendment. Any action
outside of a physical invasion is open to vigorous debate. Even the
other per se category established in Lucas-loss of all economically
beneficial use-is uncomfortably fuzzy at the boundaries. First, the
determination of "all" is hardly a precise mathematical calculation.
Even before commencing the arithmetic, the court must define the
extent of the affected property interest. The court must then deter-
mine how much of it is gone in order to complete the calculation.
Even if the calculation yields a total loss, the court cannot yet close
the book. Instead, it must decide, based on "background principles"
of state law, whether the rights that were lost were ever ownership
rights in the first place.
Without a physical invasion or total economic loss, a judge must
divine whether or not a regulation "substantially advance[s] legitimate
state interests."6 Although the Court discusses various factors in the
context of that analysis from time to time, it ultimately offers little
guidance on the weight or priority of any of them, and sends conflict-
ing signals on the appropriate degree of deference to be given to the
government.
Amid the confusion, there remains a recurring theme: fairness.
The struggles in the regulatory takings cases reflect the Justices' ef-
forts to ensure that social benefits and burdens are distributed equita-
bly, if not necessarily evenly. This core notion of fairness was
captured by Justice Hugo Black:
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be
taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole. 69
This quotation has been repeated often in opinions. " Indeed, Chief
Justice Rehnquist labeled it "axiomatic" when he quoted it in First
English.71 The fairness rationale has been used for centuries to justify
67. Id. at 1029.
68. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
69. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
70. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
71. 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987).
19971
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
compensated takings-that is, eminent domain."2 Frank Michelman,
in his pathbreaking Harvard Law Review article, argued that fairness,
or "evenhandedness," was incorporated into the Court's takings tests
and "this [fairness] approach, indeed, derive[d] some indirect support
from its power to explain much that is otherwise mysterious about the
[takings] doctrines."73
Admittedly, fairness is a complicated concept, as regulatory takings
jurisprudence has forcefully demonstrated. In regulatory takings,
preventing individuals from being singled out to bear social burdens is
a crucial element of fairness. Another important component, how-
ever, is clarity; clarity provides certainty, allowing landowners to know
the boundaries of permissible government action in order to conform
their own actions and properly confine their expectations. Even con-
ceding that the Court has achieved some success with the first ele-
ment, proportional burdens, it has failed with the second. Small
wonder, then, that those in search of clarity might turn elsewhere. 4
72. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *139; William B. Stoebuck, A Gen-
eral Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 583-84 (1972) (citing 17th
century scholars Grotius, Pufendorf, de Vattel, and Van Bynkershoek).
73. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1226 (1967); see also
William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 4-5 (1995)
(noting that fairness has long been a justification for just compensation requirement
and is useful in analyzing regulatory takings).
74. Turning to state courts would not solve the problem, although the law of every
state includes some form of the just compensation requirement set forth in the Fifth
Amendment. See Stoebuck, supra note 72, at 554-55 (stating that every state except
North Carolina has a takings clause in its constitution, and North Carolina has judi-
cially adopted the compensation requirement). Typically, state court litigants make
regulatory takings claims based on federal and state law. State courts commonly cite
the tests enunciated by the Supreme Court, without explaining very precisely whether
the tests apply to state as well as federal claims. See, e.g., Cannone v. Noey, 867 P.2d
797 (Alaska 1994) (applying Lucas' test for per se taking where federal and state
claims were raised); State Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994)
(applying federal Supreme Court tests for federal and state claims); Zeman v. City of
Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996) (discussing Lucas' total loss of value test,
Penn Central factors, and harm-preventing rationale from Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887), in the context of federal and state claims); Board of Supervisors v. Omni
Homes, Inc., 481 S.E. 2d 460 (Va. 1997) (reviewing Lucas' per se rule and using Penn
Central factors to analyze federal and state claims). Even in the uncommon case
based solely on the state constitution, the tests employed seem quite similar to the
Supreme Court tests. See, e.g., Bauer v. Waste Management of Conn., Inc., 662 A.2d
1179 (Conn. 1995) (explaining that the state test was whether "practical confiscation"
occurred, which the court conceded was no different from Lucas' per se rule); Quirk v.
Town of New Boston, 663 A.2d 1328 (N.H. 1995) (holding that the state rule did not
permit a taking if the zoning regulation did not substantially destroy the value of
property, which seems very close to the Lucas test).
The state courts offer no greater clarity than the federal courts. Indeed, based on
the variations in analysis among courts, they may contribute greater confusion.
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II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE STATES
A. State Legislative Activity
The recent spate of Supreme Court regulatory takings opinions may
have rekindled interest in the just compensation dilemma, but has had
no widespread impact on property owners. More successful efforts
focused closer to home, as legislators, encouraged by coalitions of
property interests, seized the initiative in addressing regulatory tak-
ings. During the 1990s, twenty-six states75 have passed bills relating to
property rights protection.76 The statutes can generally be divided
into two categories.' The majority of the bills fall into the "assess-
ment" category, which means they simply require public officials to
consider whether or not any proposed rule would result in a taking.
The others are "remedial"; they create a new process for obtaining
compensation.78 Each category will be considered in turn.
75. Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See State Appendix, infra note 76.
76. No two state statutes are identical, but many have common features; this sec-
tion attempts to sketch the general contours of the current legislation. For more de-
tail, consult the summary of the statutes included as an Appendix to this article
[hereinafter, the "State Appendix"]. The State Appendix discusses all states except
Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Oregon, which are summa-
rized infra note 77. For a feature-by-feature analysis of state statutes, see Mark W.
Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constinttion: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 Ecol-
ogy L.Q. 187, 204-15 (1997).
77. A few states fall outside the categories, but have singled out specific types of
property for protection:
Mississippi created an inverse condemnation action for those engaged in "forestry
activity." 1994 Miss. Laws 647. Curiously, the statute specifically excludes a "taking"
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or the state constitution from the defini-
tion of "inverse condemnation." 1994 Miss. Laws 647, §§ 6(d)(1), 6(k). It does, how-
ever, permit an inverse condemnation action if forest land is reduced in value by more
than forty percent. 1994 Miss. Laws 647, § 6(g).
NEVADA chose to safeguard water rights. 1995 Nev. Stat. 408.
NEw Mmco also clarified that water rights would not be modified or taken away
under the state's Water Quality Act. 1995 N.M. Laws 133.
NORTH CAROLINA protected those who cultivate shellfish along its coast by estab-
lishing a compensation action for anyone who believes the state "has deprived him of
his private property rights in land under navigable waters or his right of fishery in
navigable waters." 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 717.
OREGON singled out historic preservation in a statute allowing landowners to es-
cape from historic property designations. A landowner can refuse consent to the
designation of her property as "historic," which would effectively halt any efforts to
register the property in the National Register of Historic Places or otherwise label it
in any permanent way. 1995 Or. Laws 693, § 21(1). She can also remove any historic
designation placed on it by a local government. 1995 Or. Laws 693, § 21(3).
78. It is difficult to divide the categories neatly because the remedial statutes gen-
erally also contain assessment requirements. Those states with both assessment and
remedial requirements are summarized in both parts of the State Appendix, with ap-
propriate cross-references.
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1. Assessment Statutes
The state statutes vary, but this section synthesizes typical provi-
sions. Most statutes require the state attorney general or agencies to
review proposed actions to avoid regulatory takings. Many require
the state attorney general to develop guidelines for regulators to fol-
low to avoid regulatory takings.79 The guidelines are to be based on
federal and state constitutional law and must be updated annually. 0
Agencies are required to consider the guidelines when drafting regula-
tions and analyze the potential regulatory takings impact, usually in
written form."' Typically, the agency's analysis ends the process; how-
ever, in some cases, the state attorney general performs a final review.
Some statutes explicitly preclude any lawsuit based on the assess-
ment law except suits against agencies for failure to prepare a takings
impact analysis. Most say nothing about the final product, but a few
make the assessment process and reports confidential."2
2. Remedial Statutes
A smaller number of states provide remedial processes for ag-
grieved landowners, ranging from voluntary mediation to administra-
tive review to a new cause of action against an agency. Because there
are so few of them and, unlike the assessment statutes, they differ so
markedly from each other, the state statutes will be summarized
individually.
Arizona83 created an administrative appeal before a hearing officer
designated by the local government, but only for a "dedication or ex-
action" required of a landowner in connection with approval of his
proposed development. If the exaction is not removed by the hearing
officer, the landowner may go to court for a trial de novo.
79. These statutes are patterned closely after President Ronald Reagan's Execu-
tive Order No. 12,630. See 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994). The
Executive Order required the Attorney General to draft guidelines for federal agen-
cies and required the agencies to complete an analysis of the impact of proposed
regulations on property rights. For a detailed discussion of the Executive Order and
the agencies' responses to it, see Lynda L. Butler, The Politics of Takings: Choosing
the Appropriate Decisionmaker, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 749 (1997).
80. A "taking" is generally defined as whatever would require compensation
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-not all include the state constitution.
See State Appendix, § A.
81. The scope of the state legislation varies. Some statutes cover state agencies
only, but a few cover only specified state agencies. Other states limited their bills to
local governments, while still others extend to state agencies and localities. Id.
82. Idaho and Indiana make the information subject to attorney-client privilege.
See Idaho and Indiana in State Appendix, § A; Idaho Code § 67-8003(2) (1995); Ind.
Code Ann. § 4-22-2-32(0 (Michie Supp. 1997).
83. See Arizona in State Appendix, § B; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.12 (1996)
(city), § 11-810 (West Supp. 1997) (county).
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Idaho' similarly allows a landowner who would be adversely af-
fected by a permit decision to request an administrative hearing. The
landowner retains an option to go to court after exhausting adminis-
trative processes.
Maine85 created a voluntary mediation program for aggrieved land-
owners who have exhausted their administrative remedies. Dissatis-
fied owners may still go to court after mediation.
Florida8 6 enacted the most intricate scheme, establishing a
mandatory administrative complaint process as a prerequisite to court
action if a landowner believes he has been "inordinately burdened" by
a state or local government decision. The statute explicitly character-
izes the claim as a new cause of action, completely independent of any
potential takings claim. Judicial review is available if the parties are
unable to reach an administrative settlement.
Texas87 also imposed a more detailed scheme, first by expanding the
definition of "taking" beyond the state and federal constitutional stan-
dard to include any action that diminished the value of land by
twenty-five percent. A landowner can file a complaint in district court
against local governments, but must pursue an administrative com-
plaint first against state agencies.
Despite the emphasis on the federal Constitution by property rights
advocates and in most property rights statutes, the activist and legisla-
tive activities in the states have actually worked to insure that deci-
sions about property rights will not be made by federal courts. As
explained in part C, the justiciability and preclusion doctrines applied
to takings disputes will mean that, with very rare exceptions, either
state legislatures, state agencies, or state courts vill determine the ex-
tent of property rights protections.
C. Federal Ripeness Requirements will Keep the Cases in the States
The Constitution confines the jurisdictional reach of the federal
courts to "cases" and "controversies."' In addition to the strictures
of Article III, judges have more general prudential concerns; in es-
sence, they do not want to waste judicial resources and intangible judi-
cial capital on abstract, speculative questions. The proper function of
the courts is to resolve actual disputes for people who are actually
harmed by them. 9 The justiciability doctrines, including ripeness,
84. See Idaho in State Appendix, § B; Idaho Code § 67-6521 (Supp. 1997).
85. See Maine in State Appendix, § B; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5. § 3341 (%Vest
Supp. 1996).
86. See Florida in State Appendix, § B; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 70.001 (Vest Supp. 1997).
87. See Texas in State Appendix, § B; Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii)
(West Supp. 1996).
88. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
89. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997) (stating
that Fifth Amendment ripeness analysis includes prudential as well as constitutional
elements); see generally 13A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Proce-
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have developed to permit judges to determine the appropriate cases
to hear.9" Ripeness, however, has taken on particular significance in
the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court developed a two-part standard for determining
whether or not a takings claim was ripe for review.91 The standard is
based on the bifurcated nature of the Just Compensation Clause.
Fifth Amendment violations require appropriation of private property
plus failure to compensate; unless a claimant proves that both criteria
are satisfied, her claim is not ripe.'
dure § 3532.1, at 114-22 (2d ed. 1984) (describing constitutional and jurisprudential
sources of ripeness doctrine).
90. See generally Wright et al., supra note 89, § 3532.1, at 130-34 (discussing ripe-
ness in relation to justiciability doctrines of standing and mootness).
91. Note that there are two types of Fifth Amendment challenges. A landowner
may claim that a regulation, "as applied" to a particular parcel of land, operates to
deprive him of property without compensation. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994) (challenging specific regulations of a specific property). The second
category is a "facial" challenge; the plaintiff claims that a law, simply by its enactment,
inevitably and in all circumstances unconstitutionally deprives him of property. See,
e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (plaintiffs argued that ordinance
was invalid no matter how it was applied). There is some confusion in the cases, and
considerable disagreement among the commentators, about whether the ripeness re-
quirement applies to "facial" challenges or only to "as applied" challenges. See Brian
W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness
and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 73, 82-
83 (1988) (arguing that ripeness is inapplicable to facial claims); Gregory Overstreet,
The Ripeness Doctrine of the Takings Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing Just
How Far Federal Courts will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. Land
Use & Envtl. L. 91, 102 (1994) (same); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and
Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1995) (same). But see Kenneth
A. Ehrlich, Reaping the Fruits of a Ripe Property Takings Challenge: Eliminating the
Ripeness Problem in Facial Regulatory Takings Cases, 30 Santa Clara L. Rev. 865
(1990) (arguing that ripeness is applicable to facial claims); R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality
Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases from Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. Land Use &
Envtl. L. 101, 111-12 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court has noted at least one
circumstance when a facial claim is unripe); Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment
Takings Claims in Federal Court: The State Compensation Requirement and Principles
of Res Judicata, 24 Urb. Law. 479, 488-92 (1992) (arguing that ripeness does and
should apply to facial claims, but noting confusion in Supreme Court analyses). The
Supreme Court devoted a short footnote to this point last term, but did not give a
categorical answer. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1666 n.10 ("Such 'facial' challenges...
are generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation ... is passed .... ").
92. The Court detailed its ripeness test in Williamson County Reg'l Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In finding Hamilton Bank's claim
unripe, the Court explained that it could not determine whether a taking had oc-
curred until it knew the extent of the government's interference with the landowner's
use of the land. Id. at 191-94. Unless and until the bank petitioned the zoning appeals
board for the appropriate variances to overcome the planning commission's objec-
tions to the original development plan, and the appeals board issued a decision, the
Court could not determine how extensively, if at all, the government had interfered
with the bank's use. Id. at 193-94. In short, until the bank had sought regulatory
approval at all levels, the government's decision could not be considered final.
Williamson County also identified a second ripeness requirement: the compensa-
tion petition. Noting that the state of Tennessee had a statutory procedure through
which aggrieved landowners could seek compensation for inverse condemnation, the
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Ironically, the actions that a landowner must take in the state sys-
tem to ripen her federal claim will likely bar her from ultimately
presenting her case before a federal district court.93 To prosecute her
compensation claim in state court, she must prove that the state did
something improper and would be required to pay her for it. In mak-
ing that claim, even if she confines herself to state law and does not
raise federal constitutional issues, she runs a substantial risk that her
federal claims will be barred from federal court under doctrines
designed to limit repetitive litigation: res judicata and collateral
estoppel.94
The principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel can, and do,
operate in these Fifth Amendment cases to prevent a second, federal
adjudication of issues or claims arising out of the same occurrence. 95
The doctrines, though often paired, are independent bases for limiting
or stopping litigation. In essence, res judicata will bar a litigant from
raising, in a subsequent suit, any claims that are based on the same
incident and were or could have been raised in the prior suit. 6 Collat-
Court mandated that the bank also pursue the state compensation remedy before
bringing a federal claim. Because the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit all takings,
but simply uncompensated takings, the Court reasoned, the bank's claim could not be
ripe until the state refused compensation. Id. at 194-97.
93. See Stein, supra note 91, at 92-97.
94. See Roberts, supra note 91, at 484-88.
95. The federal courts have an additional statutory mandate concerning cases like
these from state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides that state judicial proceedings
"shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State." Relying on § 1738, the Supreme Court has held that the res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel doctrines apply to constitutional challenges commenced pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the route regulatory takings cases would follow. See Migra v. War-
ren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (applying res judicata); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (applying collateral estoppel).
The Supreme Court has also deferred to state agencies. The preclusion doctrines
have been applied to state court proceedings reviewing state agency determinations.
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982). They have also been
applied to determinations made by a state agency acting in a "judicial capacity," unre-
viewed by a court. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788,797-99 (1986). Not
all unreviewed state agency decisions, however, will be given preclusive effect. See
generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.10, at 511-13 (2d ed. 1994).
96. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments discusses the effect of a judgment on
the original claim using the traditional "merger" and "bar." If the plaintiff prevails,
all of his claims are "merged" in the judgment and he cannot later bring an action on
all or any part of the claim (although he may maintain an action to enforce the judg-
ment, if needed). Restatement (Second) of the Law of Judgments § 18 cmt. a (1982).
Similarly, if the plaintiff pursues an action on the judgment obtained in the original
case, the losing defendant cannot subsequently offer defenses he raised or could have
raised in the original suit. See id. § 18 cmt. b. "Bar" protects defendants; a judgment
in favor of the defendant bars a later action on the same claim by the losing plaintiff.
Id. § 19. The determination of a "claim" for purposes of merger and bar-i.e. what
the plaintiff or defendant raised or could have raised in the first suit-is a subtle,
difficult question to which the Restatement devotes fifty-five pages, comprising three
sections. See id. §§ 24-26; see generally, Wright et al., supra note 89, §§ 4407-08 (dis-
cussing definition of "claim" and offering illustrations).
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eral estoppel deals with issues that were, in fact, litigated in a previous
case. 97 In a later case, the second trial court is precluded from reopen-
ing any legal or factual issues that were "actually litigated and deter-
mined" and were "essential to the judgment" in the first case. 98
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an owner in
state court to avoid the facts, issues or claims that would ultimately
bar the federal Fifth Amendment action. Now that state legislatures
are weighing in with new standards and procedures related to regula-
tory takings, the specter of res judicata and collateral estoppel looms
larger. Unless the Supreme Court grants certiorari, federal review
will likely be foreclosed. The practical result of this procedural tangle
will be to place the primary responsibility for compensation decisions
on the states.
III. DECIDING WHO SHOULD DEFINE COMPENSABLE AcIONS
The federal courts have created a system which will avoid, to the
greatest extent possible, making compensation questions federal ques-
tions. The state legislatures have shown their willingness to tackle the
issue, but their efforts raise a fundamental question: will their activi-
ties produce better results? Until now, the courts have assumed the
sole responsibility for defining compensable government actions in
the context of the Just Compensation Clause. The surge in legislative
activity forces consideration of the proper choice of institutional
decisionmaker.
In choosing the proper arrangement, it is important, first, to bear
the ultimate goal in mind. In this instance, the goal is to define more
clearly, in light of the core notion of fairness in distributing public
burdens, the circumstances under which the government will pay
property owners based on the effect of some government action on
their property. A clearer description of the boundaries will permit
both the government and the property owners to plan and regulate
their behavior appropriately. For these purposes, the question of gov-
ernment payment to landowners is not strictly a constitutional one,
though it has constitutional parameters. The government could
choose to pay property owners more often than the constitution re-
quired-the Fifth Amendment merely sets a floor. The problem the
states seek to resolve is first and foremost a financial one and only
secondarily a constitutional one.
Much current discussion of institutional decisionmakers is rooted in
interest group political theory, principally applied by its economic
97. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments actually chooses the term "issue pre-
clusion" over collateral estoppel, apparently to avoid confusion over the two tradi-
tional types of estoppel. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Judgments § 17 cmt. c,
§ 27 (1982).
98. Id. § 27; see also id. § 28 (listing exceptions to the general rule), § 29 (discuss-
ing issue preclusion in suits against other parties).
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cousin, public choice theory.99 The answers from public choice the-
ory, however, are ultimately unsatisfying because the analysis cannot
frame the question properly. The analysis begins with a stark ques-
tion: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the decisionmaking
institution that suit it well or poorly to make this compensation deci-
sion? As this part discusses in detail, the public choice analysis typi-
cally ends with this question as well. Although public choice is useful,
it only moves part way to a solution. It outlines the choices, but offers
scant guidance about how to make the choice.
A. Introduction to Public Choice Theory: Lawmaking and
Economics
Public choice theory has been defined generally as the application
of economic principles to political institutions."° Public choice theo-
rists postulate that lawmakers' 0 ' are rational decisionmakers who are
motivated by the desire to maximize their personal benefit or "util-
ity.' 1 2 In economic shorthand, they are "rational maximizers."
Lawmakers seek to maximize their reelection chances, since their of-
fice is the font from which all other benefits flow. Reelection requires
money and approval, and lawmakers will try to arrange their activities
to get the most of both.'0 3
Not surprisingly, theories based on this rational maximization prem-
ise lead to less than exemplary group behaviors." The economic per-
99. Economists James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock produced the seminal work
in the public choice field in 1962, which claimed to straddle the border between poli-
tics and economics. James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent:
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor Paperback 1965)
(1962). The authors explained their purpose was "to analyze the calculus of the ra-
tional individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice." Id. at vi.
100. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical In-
troduction 1 (1991).
101. Public choice focuses on legislators because it is primarily concerned with pub-
lic law. See id.
102. "Utility" is a marvelously elastic economic term which is used to describe the
level of satisfaction a person derives from an activity or a good. See Robert S. Pindyck
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 88-89 (4th ed. 1997). Economists numeri-
cally rank individual preference among activities in order to graph utility distribu-
tions. These utility curves enable economists to make predictions about people's
behavior and their demand for goods and services. See generally id. ch. 3.
103. Farber & Frickey, supra note 100, at 22 n.45.
104. Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, a pioneering economist in using game theory
as a description of group decisions, laid the foundation for the most dismal portrait:
the chaos of majority voting. Essentially, Arrow's Theorem demonstrates that, if the
majority rules, the majority's choice will cycle endlessly depending on the order in
which choices are presented for a vote. For example, assume a world comprised of
three voters, Kimberly, Will and Pete, and three choices, labeled Q, R, and S.
Kimberly's preferences are (in order) Q, R, S; Will's preferences are R, S, Q; and
Pete's preferences are S, Q, R. If the first vote pits Q against R, Q will win (Kimberly
and Pete); however, Q will then lose in the next vote against S (Will and Pete). If the
voting order changes, the result will change. If, instead, the first vote is R against S, R
1997]
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spective on the legislative process rests on the assumption that
legislators and those who seek legislative help are all trying to maxi-
mize benefits. Thus, they will not support a given legislative action
unless the benefit to them exceeds their cost. 10 5 This search by indi-
viduals and interest groups for special benefits is known as "rent-
seeking. "106
Cost-benefit analysis provides insight into the most profound flaw
in the lawmaking process, known as "minority capture" or "mi-
noritarian bias."'0 7 Minoritarian bias describes situations in which co-
hesive minorities are able to influence lawmakers to pass legislation
they favor. Although everyone has preferences and seeks to maxi-
mize utility, not everyone will seek to influence legislative choice
every time. The decision to exercise political influence is predicated
on the same analysis as all other individual decisions: whether the
benefit will exceed the cost. Legislative influence is costly; it takes
time and effort, in addition to cash. At a minimum, there are the costs
associated with gathering and disseminating information, as well as
organizing individuals into groups. There may be costs for lobbying
lawmakers directly, including campaign contributions. As the size of
the group increases, the costs increase as well.10 8
Legislative rent-seeking also unavoidably suffers from a "free-
rider" problem. With any public measure, it is impossible to limit the
benefit to the people who actually organized and contributed or lob-
bied for it. For example, if a sales tax rebate for prescription drugs
will win (Kimberly and Will), but Q will be the ultimate winner (Will and Pete). In
each case, the winner will be different and a majority will prefer one of the losers.
The cycle can be avoided by strategic voting; for example, Kimberly would not vote
her true preference in the first round in order to make sure her preference triumphed
in the next round. In addition, obviously, the cycle can be broken, and the outcome
controlled, by the agenda-setter (the person who can dictate the order of voting). The
problems of strategic voting and agenda-setting make it doubtful that any majority
vote is an accurate reflection of popular consensus. See Farber & Frickey, supra note
100, at 38-42; William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of
Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures,
74 Va. L. Rev. 373, 381-88 (1988); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Compre-
hensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 7-9
(1991). An equally problematic variant of strategic voting is "logrolling," an Ameri-
can political idiom for vote trading among legislators to gain support for pet projects.
For example, Pete would agree to vote for a dam project in Will's legislative district if
Will promised to vote for a bridge project in Pete's legislative district. See Buchanan
& Tullock, supra note 99, at 155-58; Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institu-
tional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 Va. L. Rev. 625, 635-42 (1994).
105. See Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The
Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 Va. L. Rev. 179, 181 (1988) (arguing that narrow self-
interest is a significant motive of political agents, though not the sole motive).
106. See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in
Law, Economics, and Public Policy 55 n.3 (1994) (summarizing the work of economist
George Stigler on rent-seeking).
107. Id. at 54-56.
108. See Buchanan & Tullock, supra note 99, at 112.
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was championed by a senior citizens organization and passed, the re-
bate would not be limited to the organization members. Everyone
who bought a prescription drug would benefit, whether or not they
worked for the legislative change. As group size grows, the tempta-
tion to "let someone else do it" also grows."°
Using cost-benefit analysis, minoritarian bias is easier to under-
stand. Any legislation with costs limited to a small group and widely
dispersed benefits or, similarly, with highly concentrated benefits and
widely dispersed costs, will spur the concentrated group to take ac-
tion. 10 Since their payoff is big and their organizing cost relatively
small, the concentrated interest group will coalesce. Their dispersed
opponents, however, will not; the higher organizing costs and in-
creased free-rider problems mean no one will find it worthwhile to
mount an organized opposition."' Thus, an organized, cohesive mi-
nority can "capture" the legislature, to the detriment of the general
welfare.112
Public choice also offers a new slant on an old evil: the tyranny of
the majority." 3 Domination and exploitation of the minority by the
entrenched majority form the dark cloud that lurks always on democ-
racy's horizon. In light of the insights of public choice into the legisla-
ture's susceptibility to minoritarian capture, it seems incongruous to
speak of majoritarian exploitation. How could the same entity be
controlled by the minority and the majority?
Public choice explains away the anomaly by focusing once again on
cost and benefit." 4 The majority, by definition, has a numerical ad-
vantage, but that numerical advantage is worthless unless the majority
members get information about the issue, organize and enter the
political fray. The lower the per capita benefit, whether relative to the
cost or in absolute terms, the less likely the majority will become ac-
tive, which leaves the field wide open for minority interest groups
whose members have a higher per capita stake in the outcome.' 5 The
109. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 100, at 23; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Col-
lective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 134 (1971).
110. See Komesar, supra note 106, at 68.
111. See id. at 69-70.
112. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 100, at 33-34. But see Peter H. Schuck,
Against (and For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 Yale L & Pol'y Rev.
553 (1997) (noting the benefits to society of special interest groups).
113. Komesar attributes the phrase to de Tocqueville, but prefers the less pejorative
"majoritarian bias." Komesar, supra note 106, at 76.
114. See generally id. at 65-82 (discussing factors that determine the relative
strengths and weaknesses of minoritarian and majoritarian interest groups).
115. Komesar does point out one counterweight to the disorganized majority,
which he calls "catalytic subgroups." These are small groups (or even individuals)
within the majority who have sufficiently high stakes that they can galvanize the ma-
jority, or at least credibly threaten it. Their success at mobilizing is, again, a function
of the cost of organizing and disseminating information. Komesar posits that the cost
is inversely related to the amount of information the majority already has, the corn-
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
recognition that costs and benefits are distributed differently for dif-
ferent issues and at different times" 6 makes it understandable that
sometimes numerical minority groups will prevail."'
B. An Illustration of Minoritarian Bias (With a Majoritarian
Response): Washington's Property Rights Initiative
The state of Washington's foray into property rights legislation of-
fers an example of the virtues and vices of the legislative process. In
Washington, conservative property rights activists, a well-organized
minority funded by the state farm bureau, home builder and realtor
groups, and several timber companies," 8 drafted an initiative mea-
sure" 9 mandating compensation any time property was taken for pub-
lic use or its use limited for any reason except the prevention of a
public nuisance.120 They gathered sufficient signatures to present the
initiative to the legislature, which approved it.121 Opponents of the
measure successfully gathered signatures in favor of a referendum 122
on the bill. 123 Their primary weapon was the astronomical cost to tax-
payers of compensation for every government action, which the Uni-
versity of Washington's Institute for Public Policy projected to be in
plexity of the issue, and the per capita stake of the remaining majority. See id. at 82-
84.
116. Fischel makes a similar point with levels of government: small local govern-
ments tend toward majoritarian bias, while state and federal governments tend to-
ward minoritarian bias. Fischel, supra note 73, at 328. He would advocate greater
judicial scrutiny in majoritarian bias situations, where some victims of regulatory tak-
ings are completely shut out. Id. at 367.
117. Majoritarian bias may act as a countervailing force against minoritarian bias.
See Komesar, supra note 106, at 65-75.
118. David Postman, Wash. State Rejects Land Rights Law: Defeat May Slow Down
National Legislation, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1995, at El.
119. The Washington constitution permits citizens to present an initiative to the
state legislature for approval if the initiative petition is signed by voters equal to at
least eight percent of the number of people who voted in the most recent gubernato-
rial election. The legislature must accept or reject it without amendment. Wash.
Const. art. II, § 1(a).
120. Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act, I.M. No. 164, ch. 98, 1995 Wash.
Legis. Serv. 98 (West).
121. Kathy George, Big Guys Bow Out of Ballot Measure: Property Rights Leaders
Undaunted, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 2, 1995, available at 1995 WL 4319416.
122. Any bill passed by the legislature, including an initiative, can be subject to
popular referendum by petition of voters equal to at least four percent of the number
of people who voted in the most recent gubernatorial election. Wash. Const. art. II,
§ 1(b).
123. George, supra note 121, at B1.
[Vol. 66
"JUST COMPENSATION" DILEMMA
the billions. 2 4 Based largely on fears of high cost, it was defeated at
the polls by a wide margin.'25
The Washington experience is a good public choice illustration of
the forces at work in the political process. Initially, the minority was
able to "capture" the legislature and win approval of a measure which
afforded its interests large tangible benefits (but widely dispersed the
costs). Once the law was passed and more information about it be-
came public, catalytic subgroups in the majority were able to mobilize
opposition by focusing on a simple message--catastrophic cost-and
convincing voters that their stakes in the outcome were high.12b
Moreover, although the Washington experience can be read as a cau-
tionary tale of the difficulty of crafting a workable, palatable regula-
tory takings statute, it also illustrates the relative flexibility of the
legislative process in that the majority was able to force a change in
course comparatively quickly.
C. Single Institutional and Comparative Institutional Analysis
Interestingly, commentators critical of the legislature because of mi-
noritarian bias, as well as those who fear the tyrannical majority, typi-
cally advocate the same solution: the judiciary. Their advocacy of
judicial review includes judicial protection of property rights.12 7 John
Hart Ely, for example, advocated the judiciary as the protector of dis-
crete, politically powerless minorities." In Ely's view, a primary judi-
cial function is to scrutinize the content of and legislative process for a
bill to determine whether all sides participated or some groups were
shut out. 2 9 He interpreted the Just Compensation Clause as "yet an-
other protection of the few against the many."' "
Richard Epstein advocated stricter judicial scrutiny of legislation
from a different perspective. Based on his views that much economic
legislation involves forced redistribution of wealth from those who
124. Rob Eure, Washington Voters Reject Effort to Restrict Government Takings,
The Oregonian, Nov. 8, 1995, at All (reporting that $300,000 to $1 billion would be
required to meet economic impact study requirements in 1994, and $3.8 billion to $11
billion for compensation).
125. Postman, supra note 118, at El (reporting that the "citizen-written measure
was defeated by a 3-2 margin"). It is interesting to note that the other two states
which have put property rights bills on a referendum, Arizona and Rhode Island,
have also defeated them. See Eure, supra note 124, at All.
126. Postman, supra note 118, at El (noting environmental and other groups or-
ganizing opposition to measure). Catalytic subgroups are discussed supra note 115.
127. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan.
L. Rev. 29, 48-72 (1985) (arguing that courts should enforce more stringently rational-
ity requirements of, inter alia, the Just Compensation Clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, Con-
stitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 Tul. L Rev. 849, 875
(1980) (advocating judicial scrutiny and invalidation of private-interest legislation).
128. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
129. See id. (especially ch. 4 (discussing the process of representation), ch. 6 (dis-
cussing the representation of minorities)).
130. Id. at 97.
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have property to those who do not, he suggested that a judge should
routinely review legislation, particularly those regulating or redistrib-
uting property (broadly defined), to invalidate rent-seeking legisla-
tion."' Others have made a similar argument, that the judiciary
should raise its level of scrutiny for economic rights to one equal to
the level of scrutiny for civil rights.'32 In their view, the rent-seeking
abuses of legislatures can only be cured with increased judicial
review.1
33
The difficulty with this approach is the implicit assumption that the
judiciary's virtues are sufficient to overcome not only the flaws of the
legislature, but its own flaws as well. Because the legislative option is
unacceptable, the judiciary must step in. The critics of expansive judi-
cial review, however, use the same process to conclude that the flaws
of the judiciary undermine its putative superiority. Judges are no bet-
ter placed-and may be worse so-to identify, understand, and bal-
ance increasingly complex property rights and harms in a growing
society.134 Neil Komesar notes that wrongs would go without redress
because the courts must wait for cases to come to them and people
who are harmed will not always sue.13 5 The courts lack the capacity to
handle the massive volume of cases that would arise if they reviewed
every legislative or executive act for compliance with the Just Com-
pensation Clause. 1 36
Einer Elhauge offered a detailed critique of the arguments favoring
increased judicial review.137 He pointed out that the description of
interest group influence as "disproportionate" was inextricably bound
up in a normative judgment about a political outcome. 38 He also
noted that there was no basis in public choice theory to exclude judges
from the population of rational maximizers, and no guarantee that
they would behave any better than their legislative colleagues. 139 He
found the cost-benefit arguments for increased judicial review lacking
as well. Even if judicial review made minoritarian capture more costly
by adding a judicial hurdle to the legislative one, he argued, the in-
creased cost would not necessarily discourage a special interest group.
Given that a judicially vindicated law would be more likely to stay in
131. See Epstein, supra note 7, at 281; see also id. at 322 (discussing welfare regimes
as rent-seeking).
132. See Riker & Weingast, supra note 104, at 399.
133. See id. at 399-400.
134. See Gillette, supra note 104, at 634-35, 686 (finding no basis to believe that thejudiciary is sufficiently superior at ferreting out expropriative legislation to justify cost
of review).
135. This is because cost to the potential plaintiff exceeds benefit, or the potential
plaintiff has insufficient information, for example. Komesar, supra note 106, at 137.
136. Id. at 238.
137. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judi-
cial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991).
138. Id. at 49-59.
139. Id. at 80-83.
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place, it would become even more valuable and could be worth more
than the extra cost to the interest group. 4 '
Ultimately, the flaw in the analysis has nothing to do with inaccura-
cies in the description of the institutional defects; rather, it comes
from assuming that if the legislature is a bad choice, then the judiciary
must be a good one. Komesar described this as a flaw of "single insti-
tutional analysis," and advocated comparative institutional analysis."'
In a sense, comparative institutional analysis simply asks the follow-up
question. The first question, the one which public choice answers
readily, is "What is wrong with this institution?" This single question
cannot end the inquiry, however, because all institutions are flawed.
The next question should be "Which institution is the 'best'-the least
flawed-for the purpose?"'14 2 Only a comparison of the structure and
operation of given institutions against each other in the context of a
given problem, such as regulatory takings, can yield insight into the
appropriate institutional arrangement. 43
Comparative institutional analysis offers tremendously valuable in-
sight into the wise use of institutional analysis, but it is still unsatisfy-
ing, at least in the regulatory takings realm, because it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that there are no good institutional choices.
The difficulty with comparative institutional analysis, as well as single
institutional analysis, is that both frame the question of the appropri-
ate decisionmaker as an absolute "either-or" choice. The implicit as-
sumption that one institution must be picked over-i.e., to the
exclusion of-another is contrary to the American constitutional
structure. Certainly, the single institutional inquiry and the compara-
tive institutional inquiry must be made. The analysis remains incom-
plete, however, until a third question is answered: "Is there a mode of
interaction between the legislative and judicial institutions that will
produce a better result?" The third question encompasses compara-
tive institutional analysis, but moves a step further; a more descriptive
term, perhaps, would be "complementary institutional analysis."
Complementary institutional analysis is consonant with the Ameri-
can structure, in which the arrogation of power to a single decision
maker is rare. The real question is who is going to take the first shot
at the problem. There is no question about who gets the last shot, at
least in the American constitutional system-the judiciary does. It is
140. Id. at 89-92.
141. See Komesar, supra note 106, at 3-7.
142. Komesar trenchantly captured the idea: "In the complex world of institutional
choice, foxes might be assigned to guard the chicken coop where the alternatives
(bears, weasels, and so forth) are worse." Id. at 204.
143. As an object lesson in the importance of comparative institutional analysis, see
Komesar's critique of Epstein's regulatory takings analysis. Id. at 235-50.
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solely the province of courts to define the constitution."' Until now,
the courts have had the only shot; if the legislature took on the prop-
erty rights problem first, would legislation assist in meeting the goals
of fairness and clarity? That is the question from a complementary
institutional perspective. The remainder of this part will use findings
from positive political theory to describe the proper role of the legisla-
ture; to resolve basic regulatory takings questions through specific
guidelines, and help narrowly frame the remaining issues for the
courts.
D. Complementary Institutional Analysis: Insights from Positive
Political Theory
Although there is general agreement that positive political theory is
distinct from public choice theory, there is noticeable disagreement
over the definitional differences.' 45 One consistent theme, however, is
that positive political theory is concerned with institutional arrange-
ments, both the operational arrangements within an institution and
the effect that institutions have on each other.'4 6 Positive political
theory recognizes that the operations of each branch of government
have an impact on the others, and that one branch, by tailoring its
activities, can modify the behavior of another, for good or ill.
Positive political theory helps focus on the impact of the legislature
on other branches of government. Congress, for example, can exer-
cise profound influence over an oversight agency through a number of
devices. By drafting a detailed, narrow charge, Congress can limit the
agency's ability to deviate from the legislative scheme established by
statute.'47 Similarly, the staff qualifications written into the statute
can affect the agency's decisions. 4 ' Civilian appointees from the
agency's target industry are likely to take a different approach to
144. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a more recent
statement of this principle, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-68
(1997).
145. In the foreword to a 1993 symposium on positive political theory ("PPT"),
Professors Farber and Frickey recounted the difficulties they had in finding definitions
of public choice and PPT. In their survey of the symposium authors, they found that
the same number of people thought public choice was a subset of PPT as thought the
reverse. A slight plurality, moreover, thought public choice and PPT were disjointed.
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 Geo. L.J. 457, 458-60 (1992) [hereinafter Foreword]. Their proposed defi-
nition: "PPT consists of non-normative, rational-choice theories of political institu-
tions." Id. at 462.
146. Farber and Frickey quoted an unnamed law professor: "By and large, public
choice scholarship is more prone to focus on abstract features of political decision-
making, such as cycling and rent-seeking under majority rule or the formation of in-
terest groups than on specific institutional arrangements such as the committee
system or court-congress-executive interaction." Foreword, supra note 145, at 461.
147. See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The
Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 673 (1992).
148. Id.
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problems than career civil servants. Congress can stymie the Presi-
dent with slow-paced confirmations of presidential appointments. 4 9
Ultimately, as the controller of the purse, Congress can adversely af-
fect all units of government through budgetary allocations.
Congress can have the same sort of impact on the judiciary as on
the executive branch. The judicial confirmation process can affect
cases. If Congress permits judicial vacancies to pile up, cases will be
delayed, sometimes quite substantially. Delays can be costly enough
to drive parties out of court; some litigants will settle, some will just
give up. Congress can certainly send signals to the President during
the confirmation process about the qualifications and political philos-
ophy of appointees that will be acceptable, although not all judges
comport with the pre-confirmation predictions about their decisions.
Congress can also expand or contract the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, as well as modify the rules of procedure, subject to constitu-
tional boundaries. 5 ' Congress may be able to circumscribe statutory
interpretation by the courts through detailed legislation, which leaves
the court less room to exercise its interpretative discretion. 51
Just as Congress can affect the other branches, judicial review, as
recognized by the Framers, is an important tool for modifying the be-
havior of Congress and the executive. 5 As Alexander Hamilton ex-
plained: "It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the leg-
islature in order among other things, to keep the latter within the lim-
its assigned to their authority.' '1 53
As public choice scholars have pointed out, judicial review of stat-
utes can mitigate the effects of bias."5 The structure of the judiciary
149. The short-lived nomination of William Weld as ambassador to Mexico is only
the most recent example. See Helen Dewar, Sen. Helmss Gavel Leaves Weld Nomi-
nation in Limbo; Chairman Thwarts Majority Call for a Hearing, Wash. Post, Sep. ;13,
1997, at Al.
150. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
151. Cf. Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of
Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary? 13 Int'l Rev. L & Econ. 349,
366-68 (1993) (explaining that Congress can frame statutes broadly, leaving the courts
with substantial room to interpret).
152. The Framers were the harbingers, if not the founders of positive political the-
ory. The recognition of the interplay and interdependence of institutions was a cen-
tral theme in the defense of the Constitution. The structure of the legislature itself is
aimed at lessening "factions." The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison). The bicameral
legislature, with different sized houses and different qualifications for members, forces
any group to command two different majorities to win passage of legislation. Alexan-
der Hamilton specifically recognized judicial review as a crucial implicit mechanism to
check the excesses of one institution. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
153. The Federalist No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
154. See, eg., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L Rev. 223
(1986).
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reveals instances in which it would be benefited by antecedent legisla-
tive action instead of relying on "common law" lawmaking.
Courts are ill-suited to handle issues that require large-scale ex-
penditures or detailed administration. 155 Courts have no direct au-
thority over public funds, nor can they readily create a large
supervisory bureaucracy. 156 The judiciary is smaller than either the
executive or legislative branches, and the process of creating and fill-
ing judgeships makes it difficult to expand rapidly. 157 The relatively
small size, coupled with the procedural requirements-such as re-
sponse times, discovery periods, and motion and briefing deadlines-
make the judiciary slower than the legislature to respond to a social
problem.1 58 The focus of the judicial process on specific litigants with
specific harms also makes litigation an awkward vehicle for resolving
systemic social problems. 59 The jurisdictional limitations on the
courts would also hamper their ability to implement broad social pol-
icy. The courts cannot seek out problems; they can only decide the
cases, first, that others bring to them, and, second, that meet the re-
quirements of justiciability. 6 '
Thinking of institutions as complementary, however, permits recog-
nition that the judiciary can be more effective resolving regulatory
takings questions through review of a statute on the subject. 16' A stat-
ute that draws a line immediately creates potential litigants; the statu-
tory base for the claim may make it easier to determine justiciability.
The statute can also provide the court with a more sharply focused
question-whether a specific process or philosophy of compensation
is appropriate-rather than the amorphous inquiry about whether the
government has "gone too far."' 6 2 The statute would also, presuma-
155. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275, 307-08 (1988).
156. See Komesar, supra note 106, at 144 n.22.
157. See id. at 123, 126-27.
158. See id. at 126-27.
159. The availability of class actions does make it easier to bring larger policy ques-
tions before the courts. See Eskridge, supra note 155, at 304. The class action mecha-
nism does not eliminate the other structural constraints, however, and may exacerbate
some, such as the slow pace of civil litigation.
160. See Elhauge, supra note 137, at 68-69; Komesar, supra note 106, at 126-28.
161. A multitude of articles and books about judicial review have focused on ap-
propriate methods of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 155; John
Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation,
80 Geo. L.J. 565 (1992); Fischel, supra note 73; Macey, supra note 154; McNollgast,
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Geo.
L.J. 705 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 127; Treanor, supra note 5. A few, such as Es-
kridge, have discussed whether or not there is any benefit to judicial review of stat-
utes, considering the relative competencies of the judiciary and the legislature. The
issue presented here is a slightly different one: In light of the issue's constitutional
overtones, the judiciary will ultimately review government action for compliance with
the Fifth Amendment. Will the judicial defining process work better if the legislature
passes a law about property rights first?
162. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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bly, relieve the court of the fiscal and administrative responsibility for
the social program.
The adversarial requirements would ensure that both sides of the
question got at least one hearing. Unlike the legislature, which can
pick and choose the views it hears, and may only hear one voice, the
court must have at least one voice on each side. If there is no oppo-
nent, there is no case.' 63 In addition to the framing of the issues in the
legislation itself, the adversaries offer specific focal points for the
court. As the case proceeds through the trial and appellate process,
additional opportunities for debate and distillation would occur. As
the state courts consider the state statutes, accepting some and re-
jecting others, the boundaries of the Just Compensation Clause will
become clearer.'" This activity at the state level may bode well for
the Supreme Court's Just Compensation Clause jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court has traditionally functioned as constitutional arbiter
of state courts,'65 and has often developed doctrine after comparing
the trials and errors of various state systems." In its review of state
court interpretations of compensation decisions, the Supreme Court
can find the uniform baseline necessitated by the Constitution.
Public choice and positive political theory highlight the flaws of the
legislature and the judiciary, but also reveal salutary ways in which the
two can work together. In the realm of property rights, the judiciary
has endured decades of difficulty, while the legislature has just en-
tered the fray. Ultimately, property owners are likely to obtain better
guidelines from legislatures, backed up by courts, than from either in-
stitution alone. This conclusion is admittedly premised on the pro-
mulgation of statutes that actually delineate standards for
compensable actions and provide courts with a concrete issue to re-
view. Part IV offers guidance to state legislatures about the content of
such statutes.
163. See Eskridge, supra note 155, at 304.
164. A legislative starting point could actually allow the courts to hear more prop-
erty rights cases. As discussed previously, the judiciary has used ripeness and preclu-
sion to keep the vast majority of these cases out of court. See supra notes 88-98 and
accompanying text. Legislation can eliminate the ripeness question by making it clear
when a final decision has been reached on permitted use of property and on
compensation.
165. See generally Wright et al., supra note 89, §§ 4006 (discussing the origin and
development of jurisdiction over state courts), 4007 (discussing the limitation of juris-
diction over judgments by a state's highest court).
166. The notion of the states as laboratories originated in the dissent of Justice
Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebinann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) ("It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.") The concept has not lost its appeal to the Court with
the passage of time. See, eg., Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1198 n.1 (1995) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,292
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
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IV. STATUTORY GUIDELINES
Not all statutes would facilitate clarification of the regulatory tak-
ings standard. The current assessment statutes, which do little more
than parrot the existing judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amend-
ment and tell the targeted agencies to follow the law, do nothing to
simplify the regulatory takings quandary. At best, they remind people
to do what they ought to be doing already. At worst, they create an
additional layer of bureaucratic review, with concomitant delay, 167
which ultimately will have little impact on regulations. 6 The general-
ity of the statutes also leaves room for manipulation by the agencies.
Where the statutes merely incorporate the Supreme Court's Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence, they may be evaded or inconsistently ap-
plied by different attorneys general or agency heads; they offer no im-
provement over the status quo. Equally important, since they offer no
additional insight into the regulatory takings definition, the assess-
ment statutes provide the court no help in refining the boundaries of
regulatory takings.1 69
Ideally, to advance the regulatory takings definition through the ju-
diciary, a statute should do at least two things. It should establish a
benchmark for offering compensation. A benchmark gives a court a
concrete point to accept or reject, and the court's decision gives
lawmakers and potential litigants a path to follow. In addition, a stat-
ute should be structured to minimize the number of disputes, and to
resolve any disputes as early as possible. Quick resolution minimizes
cost to everyone involved and helps insure that the cases that do reach
the court are the ones that present the starkest choices and the most
fundamental disagreements between the government and the land-
owner. Those are the disputes that present the clearest options to the
167. In addition to the delay involved in the internal review process, those states
permitting a private right of action to challenge an assessment or force an assessment
to be completed create an opportunity for individuals to delay significantly the imple-
mentation of a regulation. Robert Ellickson points out that this tactic has been used
often with environmental impact statements. See Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legis-
lation: A Comment, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 75, 78-79 (1996).
168. Although impossible to predict with perfect accuracy, it is unlikely that the
assessment requirements would weed out a great number of regulations. The statutes
require a "facial" assessment, meaning that the regulation, on its face, without regard
to any specific land, owner or set of circumstances, would impermissibly deprive af-
fected owners of property rights. As previously noted, facial challenges to regulations
are rarely sustained in Fifth Amendment cases. See supra note 91; see also Suitum v.
Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1666 n.10 (1997). The rule may harm
some owners greatly, others negligibly; only when the rule is applied to a particular
property owner does the taking become apparent. The "takings impact analysis" can-
not assess the individual impact; thus, unless every affected person is harmed, the rule
will pass muster. Lynda Butler's analysis of the federal agencies' response to Execu-
tive Order 12,630 (mandating takings impact analyses for proposed federal agency
rules) supports the notion that agencies would rarely find that one of their proposed
regulations failed the test. See Butler, supra note 79, at 794.
169. See generally Cordes, supra note 76, at 221-25 (critiquing assessment statutes).
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court. This part will offer statutory recommendations based upon
these two requirements, and discuss the positive and negative charac-
teristics of existing statutes in this context.
A. Definitions and Scope
Statutory definitions serve as a vehicle to limit the compensation
obligation. The statute should be confined to real property, but in-
clude all interests in the possession or use of real property. The limi-
tation to real property is consistent with the existing statutes and
seems to reflect the core of the current property rights problem-sig-
nificant limitations on the use of land, ostensibly to promote intangi-
ble public benefits. Equally important, Justice Scalia muddied the
definitional waters in Lucas by asserting, for the first time, that differ-
ent regulatory takings standards applied to real and personal prop-
erty.170 Without some compelling reason to enter this part of the
constitutional debate, confining the statutory definition to real prop-
erty seems both appropriate and sufficient. By the same token, there
is little reason to limit the reach of the statute to certain types of real
property. The current statutes limiting remedies to special-purpose
land, such as agricultural or forest land, appear to fulfill the rent-seek-
ing prophecies of public choice theory.171 There is no obvious benefit
to singling out certain types of property for compensation remedy; if a
certain type of land is often the subject of overreaching regulation, the
owners would still be compensated, perhaps frequently, even under a
statute covering all types of real property interests. If the benefit is
that the narrow statute is less costly because compensation is limited
to a small group, it is a classic example of rent-seeking.
These definitions should rely on well-settled law whenever possible,
to simplify interpretation and give clearer guidance to property own-
ers and regulators. Fortunately, there is some well-settled property
compensation law, developed under the state eminent domain stat-
utes. Real property interests can readily be ascertained with reference
to existing state eminent domain law; interests which would be com-
pensated in a straightforward condemnation action should be com-
pensated. 72 Similarly, eminent domain law can also help define the
owner, the receiver of compensation.173
A surprising number of current state statutes fail to define "prop-
erty" at all, thus providing no guidance concerning the types of inter-
ests protected by the laws. The statutes without definitions are
assessment statutes, which generally delegate much definitional dis-
170. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
171. See supra note 77 (Mississippi); Louisiana in State Appendix, § B.
172. See Model Eminent Domain Code (U.L.A.) § 103(19) (defining "real prop-
erty"), official cmt. (West 1986).
173. See id- § 103(6) (defining "condemnee" & § 204 official cmt. (discussing defini-
tion of "owner") (West 1986).
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cretion to the Attorney General in any event. 174 Allowing the Attor-
ney General to define a few more items may seem insignificant, but
discretion in defining the coverage of the statute creates opportunities
to limit its reach in ways that the legislature may have never intended.
It is one thing to let the Attorney General draft guidelines explaining
current judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment, but quite an-
other to let him figure out who and what are affected by the statute.
The statutes should also exclude activities for which the remedy is
already well understood, rather than risk adding to the uncertainty.
Statutes need not include acts covered by the state eminent domain
law, nor should they include physical invasions or appropriations of
land. Physical invasions have long been recognized as compensable
under the Fifth Amendment.'75 Including such cases under the statute
would actually create confusion instead of ameliorating it, by engraft-
ing a second-tier statutory claim onto a straightforward constitutional
claim. The statute can promote clarity by focusing specifically on the
area of confusion-regulatory takings.
Although narrow specificity is important in defining the eligible
property, the current statues tend to be overly narrow in their cover-
age of government entities. The limitation of so many statutes' reach
to state agencies seems particularly odd in light of the fact that so
much of the activity affecting land use is local, administered by munic-
ipalities and counties. Although statutorily authorized by the states,
the ordinances and regulations governing zoning, subdivision and
building requirements are all promulgated on the local level. Confin-
ing the statutory remedy to state-level activities means a great deal of
inappropriate activity could remain unaddressed. Whole categories of
difficult questions would be left in the regulatory takings muddle.
Similarly, some current statutes confine their reach to specific state
agencies.176 If the goal is to compensate owners who lose the use of
their property, it is difficult to understand why the availability of com-
pensation would turn on the identity of the entity responsible for the
deprivation. If compensation for property rights is not the goal, but
rather regulation of certain bureaucratic behavior, there are certainly
more direct and cheaper means to accomplish that end.
B. Compensable Events
The focal point of the interplay between the legislature and the
court is the establishment of statutorily compensable events. The leg-
islative creation of criteria for payment to landowners will provide
courts a compensation baseline to evaluate. The criteria need not be
174. See Delaware, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virginia in State Appendix, § A.
175. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
176. See Michigan and West Virginia in State Appendix, § A; Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 24.422(b) (West Supp. 1997); W. Va. Code § 22-1A-6 (1994).
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identical in each state. Differences in population, topography, size,
industrial concentrations, agricultural uses, and a host of other cul-
tural, historical, and economic factors may lead to variations in the
compensation scheme. The Fifth Amendment, however, does estab-
lish a minimum requirement for compensation. The core notion of
the Fifth Amendment-that the community's burdens should be dis-
tributed equitably among its citizens without singling out individuals
for a disproportionate share of the cost of community welfare-
prescribes the norm for evaluating the compensation scheme."
Three state remedial statutes require compensation whenever the
value of property is decreased by a certain percentage as a result of
regulatory activity. 178 The percentage trigger appears to move a long
way toward the goal of greater clarity, but its clarity comes with a high
cost. 17 9 The lower the trigger point, the more payments the govern-
ment will have to make. A high trigger, however, diminishes the use-
fulness of the statute since fewer people will be able to use the
remedy; moreover, a high trigger undermines fairness, since someone
who appears deserving will not be compensated. Even the clarity of
the compensation trigger is largely superficial." Stating a percentage
is not enough; the statute must be clear about the extent of the prop-
erty to be considered in calculating the percentage. Commentators
have dubbed this issue "the denominator problem." ' If the trigger is
based only on the land affected by the challenged regulation, the
chances that the percentage threshold will be met increase dramati-
cally. If the trigger is based on all the property owned by the com-
plainant, the likelihood that the threshold will be met diminishes. In
addition, because valuations are based on appraisals, the percentage
trigger offers only the illusion of precision. Appraisals contain a
number of essentially subjective components and may use several dif-
ferent approaches to determine value.l " The court will be forced to
choose among battling appraisers to determine, first, if compensation
is triggered and, if so, how much is appropriate.
Florida takes a different approach, one more explicitly consonant
with the need for fairness. The Florida statute allows compensation
177. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 77 (Mississippi); see also Louisiana and Texas in State Appen-
dix, § B.
179. See generally Cordes, supra note 76, at 225-29 (critiquing compensation
statutes).
180. See Ellickson, supra note 167, at 81 (questioning whether claimants would be
able to aggregate the effects of variety of regulations to meet the percentage).
181. See, e.g., Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem,
27 Rutgers LJ. 663 (1996) (proposing a solution for the denominator problem); Carol
M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property Public Rights, and the New Tak-
ings Legislation, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 265, 289-90 (1996) (describing the difficulty
of arriving at a denominator of property to which loss may be compared).
182. See generally Paul Goldstein & Gerald Korngold, Real Estate Transactions,
386-404 (rev. 3d ed. 1997).
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for owners who are "inordinately burdened" by a government act.' 8 3
The law essentially codifies the fairness notion that singling out indi-
viduals to shoulder social costs is impermissible. This formulation
avoids the problems with a trigger point; it also permits consideration
of benefits conferred on the owner, unlike the trigger statute. The
countervailing benefits bear on whether the burden is inordinate;
however, the statute offers no specific definition of inordinate burden.
It refers to Supreme Court descriptive phrases, but provides only a
new catch-phrase instead of a clarification of the compensation stan-
dard. Because the statute is brand new, it is open to interpretation by
agencies, judges and litigants. It offers little certainty to the govern-
ment in planning or promulgating rules, nor does it give citizens a
chance to arrange their behavior to meet (or avoid) the new rules.
By developing new vocabulary, Florida sacrificed certainty to em-
brace more closely the fairness notion. Although it avoided the calcu-
lation problems and the potential for arbitrariness of the percentage
trigger statutes, the Florida statute trades one set of definitional diffi-
culties for another. A better approach, which retains the flexibility
and fairness, but minimizes the interpretational difficulties, is to look
once again to well-settled law. In this instance, zoning law can pro-
vide a useful definitional framework for the concept of "hardship."
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act ("SSZEA"), promulgated
by the Commerce Department in 1926, used "unnecessary hardship"
as the basis on which variances from the strict enforcement of the zon-
ing ordinance could be granted."s4 To militate against the Fifth
Amendment attack, the SSZEA gave the zoning board the power to
grant "a variance from the terms of the ordinance" when the land-
owner could demonstrate that strict enforcement of the zoning ordi-
nance would cause him unnecessary hardship. 85 Comprehensive
zoning schemes would diminish property values in some instances, but
raise them in others. The SSZEA created the variance mechanism to
protect the owner singled out to bear a disproportionate burden,
thereby embracing the core notion of fairness. Almost all states
adopted the SSZEA,186 and the notion of relief based on hardship is
nearly universal.18
7
183. See Florida in State Appendix, § B; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 70.001 (West Supp. 1997).
184. SSZEA § 7(3), reprinted in Daniel R. Mandelker, et al., Planning and Control
of Land Development 199 (4th ed. 1995).
185. Id.
186. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 4.16 (3d ed. 1993).
187. See id. § 6.41. All but a handful of states have statutorily incorporated the
hardship criterion. State code sections noting hardship standard: Ala. Code § 11-52-
80 (1994 & Supp. 1996); Alaska Stat. § 29.40.050 (Michie 1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-
807 (1990); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-17-209 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995); Cal. Gov't Code
§ 65906 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-23-307 (1997); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 8-6 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 9 § 1352 (1989 &
Supp. 1996); D.C. Code Ann. § 5-424 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 70.51
(West Supp. 1997); Idaho Code § 67-6516 (1995); 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/5-12009
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Adopting the hardship standard to the compensation statute retains
the core notion of fairness and allows a degree of flexibility in making
the compensation decision. It permits consideration of special charac-
teristics of the land and the owner, but also embraces the notion of
countervailing factors which would militate against a hardship, such as
whether the owner knew of the impact of the regulation on her land
before she purchased it.1" The hardship standard also takes into ac-
count another element of fairness, benefits which inure to the land as
a result of the regulation. The presumption is that the regulation ben-
efits everyone in the community; therefore, it is up to the owner to
demonstrate that she has been singled out, and that the burden out-
weighs the benefit for her. In addition, the hardship standard has
been part of American law for over seventy years; it has been consid-
ered and refined in countless cases.189 Although not a mathematically
exact standard, it is a familiar one, and one whose parameters have
been fleshed out by generations of judges. Certainly, it will have to be
adapted to some degree to fit a compensation scheme, but it is easier
to adopt an analogous standard than to create one from whole cloth.
C. Compensation Procedures
A Just Compensation Clause claim will likely be available for con-
duct that would be covered by the statute, but the mingling of statu-
tory and constitutional claims would unnecessarily complicate the
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann. § 36-7-4-918.4 (Michie 1995 & Supp.
1997); Iowa Code Ann. § 335.15 (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-759 (1991 & Supp.
1996); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.243 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 33:4727 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 4353 (West
1996); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 40A, § 10 (Law. Co-op. 1993 & Supp. 1997); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 125.585 (West 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 394.27 (West 1997); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 65.690 (West Supp. 1997); Mont. Code Ann. § 76-2-223 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 19-910 (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 278.300 (Michie 1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 674:33 (1996 & Supp. 1996); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40-55D-70 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-21-8 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.Y. Town Law § 62-16-267
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-345 (1991); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 11-33-11 (county) & § 40-47-09 (city) (1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 519.14 (town-
ship) & § 303.14 (county) (Anderson 1992 & Supp. 1996); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 19,
§ 863.21 (county) (West 1988) & fit. 11, § 44-104 (cities) (Vest 1994); 53 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 10910.2 (West Supp. 1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-24-41 (Supp. 1996); S.C.
Code Ann. § 5-23-100 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws § 114-
17 (Michie 1995); Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-109 (county) & § 13-7-207 (municipalities)
(1992 & Supp. 1996); Tex Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 211.009 (Vest 1988 & Supp. 1997);
Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-707 (county) & 10-9-707 (municipalities) (1996); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 24 § 4468 (1992 & Supp. 1997); Va. Code. Ann. § 15.1-495 (Michie 1990);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 35A.63.110 (West 1990); W.Va. Code § 8-24-55 (1990 &
Supp. 1996); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 59.694 (Vest Supp. 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-106
(Michie 1996).
188. See Mandelker, supra note 186, at § 6.50.
189. Some may argue the hardship standard is not useful because zoning boards
routinely ignore it; however, even if that is true for the boards, it is not true for the
courts.
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issues and muddle judicial review. The simplest way for state statutes
to avoid entanglement with the constitutional cause of action is to
state explicitly that the statutory claim is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any constitutional claim. Both the Florida and Texas remedial stat-
utes note that the constitutional remedy is distinct.190 Because of the
Fifth Amendment ripeness requirements, however, it will be impossi-
ble to keep the claims entirely independent. In order to ripen the
Fifth Amendment claim, a landowner must obtain a final determina-
tion from the state or local government concerning the permissible
use of his property and the payment of compensation. Once the statu-
tory process is established, as a practical matter, claimants will be re-
quired to complete it before their Fifth Amendment claim can be
considered.
To be effective, the statutory claims process must be as simple, ex-
peditious and fair as possible. The claims could be decided adminis-
tratively or in the courts. Several current administrative claims
processes call upon the offending agency to hear the complaint and
make a decision concerning use and compensation. Although it may
be fast, it does not appear entirely fair; the accused agency has too
much of a political and financial stake in the case. Sending owners
straight to court, as Texas does, adds objectivity, but also delay.
A better solution would be to use hearing officers who are not affili-
ated with any agency involved in land regulation. 191 The system
would keep these additional claims, which may be numerous, from
clogging an already slow judicial branch. Independent hearing officers
would also lessen the actual or perceived bias in the compensation
determination. The hearing would permit the agency and the land-
owner to present arguments and evidence, and the hearing officer
would be empowered to decide both whether compensation was re-
quired by the statute and, if so, the amount of compensation. This
single decision would make it much simpler to satisfy the finality re-
quirements for Fifth Amendment ripeness if the owner wanted to
press a Fifth Amendment claim. In addition, once again, this structure
could be built upon existing state laws for administrative hearings. It
might require additional personnel, but it would not require legisla-
tors to invent an entirely new process.
D. Sources of Compensation
The only point on which assessment statutes have a discernible edge
over remedial statutes is the cost of compliance. Assessment statutes
are not without costs, but those costs are hidden in the form of extra
time expended or extra personnel required to complete the assess-
190. See Florida and Texas in State Appendix, § B.
191. Cf. Stein, supra note 91, at 62-63 (suggesting the creation of state land use
courts to minimize delay and improve expertise).
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ments. The cost of a compensation scheme, by contrast, is quite tangi-
ble and quite large. 9 ' To be credible to the public in general and
property owners in particular, a statute must be clear about its cost of
implementation and, equally important, about how that cost will be
paid. Unless the statute provides a funding method, the statutory
scheme will lose legitimacy, and the statute will not be able to provide
landowners with any greater certainty about the protection of their
property rights.
Cash is certainly the simplest form of compensation, but it is also
the most difficult to raise. The statute must establish a funding mech-
anism and insure that payments are made in a timely manner.1 93 In-
creases in ad valorem taxes are an obvious, if unpopular, fundraising
method. Given the difficulty of mustering popular support for a gen-
eral tax increase, however, the state may rely on more subtle ways of
raising funds. One arguably fair method would be to charge or in-
crease fees on activities that are incidental to land ownership-more
generally, to assess the cost of compensation against the class of po-
tential beneficiaries. Fees for recording documents in the land
records, fees for filing subdivision plats, building permit fees, and
building inspection fees are all examples of fees related to land owner-
ship and development. The problem ultimately lies with the compen-
sation trigger and the regulatory activity; there may not be enough
money to pay for the regulations that the state and local governments
want.
The states can also explore the possibility of using noncash compen-
sation. Some jurisdictions have experimented with "transferable de-
velopment rights" ("TDRs") to avoid the onerous consequences of
regulation, particularly with historic preservation or open space re-
strictions. In essence, TDRs give the landowner the right to shift the
development potential (the amount of development that would have
been allowed on the land in the absence of a regulatory prohibition)
from one tract of land to another. If the affected landowner does not
own any other land, she may sell the TDRs to someone who has land
and wants to develop it. To date, no state has built TDRs into its
remedial statute, but it appears to be a potentially useful alterna-
192. As noted above, Washington's compensation bill was estimated in the billions.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
193. One of the difficulties with S. 781, pending in the United States Senate, is the
failure to mandate a final deadline for compensation. The bill calls for compensation
to be paid out of an agency's current appropriations, but if the current appropriations
are not sufficient, the agency is to ask for an additional appropriation or fund it from
the next year's appropriation. The bill sets no limit on the time of payment, however.
See S. 781, 105th Cong., § 204(f) (1997). Since Congress must authorize the appropri-
ation, if Congress does not pass the appropriation, the agency could be trying for
"appropriations available in the next fiscal year" for many years. See id.
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tive.194 Another non-cash alternative would be some form of tax
credit. It is less obvious than a direct cash payment, but it could prove
equally devastating to the state budget if the compensation scheme
resulted in a significant drop in state revenues.
The potential defects in all these funding schemes underscore the
importance of including a specific funding mechanism in the statute.
The inclusion of funding demonstrates to the citizenry that the state is
prepared to meet its obligations, and it forces all those who debate the
statute to make a specific, concrete decision about exactly how much
private property protection is worth to them. 195
CONCLUSION
The current property rights debate highlights the difficulties of
achieving fairness and certainty in land use regimes. The perceived
inadequacies of regulatory takings jurisprudence has led legislatures
to grapple directly with private property issues. Although the prod-
ucts of those legislative struggles currently leave a great deal to be
desired, at least the property rights debate is in the right place. Legis-
latures can make the most effective contribution by drafting statutes
with concrete standards to focus litigation and frame issues for judicial
review. The courts can then work within clearer lines to define the
boundaries of the Fifth Amendment. Because of institutional struc-
ture and culture, neither the legislature nor the judiciary is suited to
solve the regulatory takings dilemma alone. By working in tandem,
however, the two institutions have a much better chance to create a
clear, sound, and fair regulatory regime for property.
194. See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using
Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 Va. L. Rev.
1801, 1867-75 (1995).
195. Texas did devise a statute that avoids the thorny question by specifying that
the only remedy available to plaintiffs would be invalidation of the offending regula-
tion. The defendant agency would retain the option to compensate the landowner in
lieu of invalidating the regulation. See Texas in State Appendix, § B; Tex. Gov't Code
Ann. § 2007.006(a) (West Supp. 1996). Note, however, that if the court determined
that the regulation was unconstitutional, not just in violation of the statute, then com-
pensation would be constitutionally required by First English, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF STATE STATUTES
A. Statutes requiring studies or assessment of regulations96
ARIZONA:' 97 Counties, cities, towns and their respective agencies
are mandated to comply with four recent Supreme Court regulatory
takings cases, 198 as well as binding state and federal court decisions.'99
By November 1, 1995, all counties, cities, and towns were to submit a
report to the legislature describing the actions they had taken to con-
form to the limits on governmental power described in the court deci-
sions.2 0 A joint committee of the legislature was to review the
reports, study possible procedures "to secure the constitutional rights
of real property owners against government intrusion," and issue its
own recommendations by December 15, 1995.201 The committee met
and reviewed the submitted reports but adjourned without making
196. Three states have taken slightly different approaches to the assessment of
property rights. The Governor of Arkansas issued an Executive Order creating a
"Task Force on Regulatory Takings" which is to review current law, assess state
procedures, study legislation from other states, and recommend legislation. The
deadline for the Task Force report was July 1, 1996. Exec. Order No. 95-04 (1995). At
this time, no report has been issued.
South Dakota passed a concurrent resolution criticizing the federal and state
governments for infringing on property rights through environmental and land use
regulation. Ii addition, the resolution urged all levels of government to reexamine
their laws and regulations to strike a better balance between environmental
protection and property rights, and to compensate landowners who sustain losses
because of environmental restrictions. Con. Res. 10 (S.D. 1995).
Utah went beyond self-study and created a "Constitutional Defense Council,"
composed of members of the executive and legislative branches, along with private
citizens appointed by the Governor. Utah Code Ann. § 63C-4-101 (1996). The
Council's charge is to study the constitutionality of a variety of federal programs and
mandates, including "federal laws or regulations that reduce or negate water rights or
the rights of owners of private property." Id. § 63C4-102. The Council then advises
the Governor and legislature on these questions, and will evaluate the feasibility of
challenging these federal programs in court. The Council's chair is empowered to
direct the Attorney General to initiate appropriate litigation. Id.
197. In 1992, the Arizona legislature passed a bill imposing stringent requirements
on state agencies to assess and avoid takings. Opponents gathered sufficient signa-
tures to force a popular referendum on the measure, which was defeated in the next
general election on November 8, 1994. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-221 (Historical
and Statutory Notes) (West Supp. 1997). The 1995 bill described in the text applies
only to counties, cities, and towns.
198. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. City of Los Ange-
les, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
199. H.B. 42-2229, 1st Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 1995) (city or town) (codified at Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann § 9-500.13 (West 1996)); id. § 2 (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann
§ 11-811 (West Supp. 1997)).
200. Id. § 3.
201. Id. § 4. The bill included a provision repealing Section 4 as of December 31,
1995. Id § 5.
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recommendations.2 °2 Arizona's remedial process is discussed infra in
part B.203
DELAWARE: Section 605 was added to Title 29 of the Delaware
Code in 1992. The statute requires the Attorney General to review
every rule or regulation issued by "any state agency, '' 204 excepting
only those rules which do not purport to restrict uses of property. 0 5
The Attorney General must then give written notice to the agency
concerning the rule's "potential .. .to result in a taking of private
property. '20 6 The statute does not define "property" or "government
action," and the governmental entity to which the statute applies is no
further defined than "any state agency. ' 2 7 "Taking" is defined as an
action for which compensation would be required under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution or similar
Delaware state law.208 In a "[j]udicial review of actions taken pursu-
ant to this section," a court may only consider whether the Attorney
General's review occurred as required under state law and whether
the agency was informed of the result in writing.20 9 Because Delaware
has an assessment statute, the law contains neither any specific reme-
dies available to landowners nor any jurisdictional requirements for
obtaining such remedies.
IDAHO: Title 67, Chapter 80, of the Idaho Code requires the Attor-
ney General to develop guidelines and a checklist "that better enables
[an agency] to evaluate proposed ... actions to assure that such ac-
tions do not result in an unconstitutional taking of private prop-
erty.21 0 "Private property" is defined as "all real property protected
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" of the United States Con-
stitution or the Idaho Constitution.211 A "taking" is an "uncompen-
sated deprivation of private property in violation of the state or
federal constitution. ' 212 As it was passed in 1994, this statute origi-
nally applied only to state agencies, 213 but in 1995 the law was broad-
ened to apply to all local governments as well.214 The state agency or
202. Joint Legislative Study Comm. on the Constitutional Regulation of Private
Real Property, Final Report, 42nd Legis. Sess. 1 (Ariz. 1995) (on file with the Ford-
ham Law Review).
203. See infra notes 342-50 and accompanying text.
204. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 605(a) (Supp. 1996).
205. Id. § 605 (reviser's note).
206. Id. § 605(a).
207. Id. § 605.
208. Id. § 605(c).
209. Id. § 605(b).
210. Idaho Code § 67-8003(1) (1995).
211. Id. § 67-8002(2).
212. Id. § 67-8002(4).
213. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 116.
214. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 182.
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local government review process is protected by the attorney-client
privilege.21 5
Additionally in 1995, a separate law charged local land use planning
commissions -with considering the effects of their plans on private
property and conducting the analysis prescribed by Title 67, Chapter
80.216 For those whose land has been affected by local planning or
zoning decisions, Idaho provides two remedies: one administrative
and the other judicial.217
INDIANA: Indiana requires every rule proposed by a state agency to
be reviewed by the Attorney General. 18 In addition to determining
whether or not the state agency followed statutory authority and
proper procedures in promulgating the rule, the Attorney General
must "consider whether the adopted rule may constitute the taking of
property without just compensation to an owner.' 2 1 9 If so, the Attor-
ney General must advise the Governor and the agency head of that
determination with that advice being protected by the attorney-client
privilege.' Neither "taking" nor "property" is defined in this statute.
The governmental entity to which the statute applies is an "agency,"
which includes "any officer, board, commission, department, division,
bureau, committee, or other governmental entity exercising any of the
executive (including the administrative) powers of state govern-
ment."' Any failure to issue an order, or part thereof, or the per-
formance of, or failure to perform any duty may be an "agency
action" to which the statute applies.22 Because it is only for assess-
ment purposes, Indiana's statute does not provide any specific reme-
dies nor any particular jurisdictional requirements to obtain them.
KANSAS: The Attorney General is required to develop guidelines
"to assist state agencies in evaluating proposed governmental actions
and in determining whether such actions may constitute a taking."2 3
215. Idaho Code § 67-8003(2) (1995).
216. Id. § 67-6508(a).
217. The remedies and the steps required to seek them are further explained in the
Idaho segment of part B of this Appendix.
218. A separate provision of the same law established an "administrative rules
oversight committee" composed of four members each from the House of Represent-
atives and the Senate. Ind. Code Ann. § 2-5-18-4, -5 (Michie 1996). Among its duties,
the committee may hear any complaint by any person concerning an agency rule or
practice. The committee may recommend repeal, modification, or adoption of a rule
based on its review of a complaint and, when appropriate, may submit a bill to the
legislature to clarify a law or correct the misapplication of a law administered by an
agency. Id § 2-5-18-8. Filing a complaint might be a prerequisite for ripeness, as well
as one example of a legitimate precondition to consideration of a facial challenge. If
the committee could have the rule abolished or modified, the takings issue might be
resolved without need for judicial pronouncement.
219. Id. § 4-22-2-32(b).
220. Id. § 4-22-2-32(f.
221. Id § 4-22-2-3.
222. Id. § 4-21.5-1-4.
223. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 77-704 (Supp. 1996).
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Each state agency must adhere to the guidelines22 4 and, before initiat-
ing any action, must issue a report which: identifies the risk to public
health, safety, or welfare created by the current use of the private
property; explains how the action will protect against that risk; and
generally describes whether the action is a taking of property.22 5 "Pri-
vate property" is limited to real property and interests in real property
that are protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution or the Kansas Constitution.22 6 A "taking"
is a governmental action that takes or restricts the use of private prop-
erty such that compensation is required pursuant to the federal or
state constitutions. 2 7 Under the statute, a state agency includes any
"officer, department, division or unit of the executive branch of the
state ... authorized to propose, adopt or enforce rules and regula-
tions" but not the legislature, the judiciary, or "any political or taxing
subdivision of the state of Kansas. '22 8 "Governmental action" in-
cludes any state agency action proposing legislation, rules and regula-
tions, or licensing guidelines or procedures. 2 9 Specifically excluded
from "governmental action" is the exercise of eminent domain, any
reduction or removal of limitations from private property, or any state
action which is in response to a violation of the law. 3 Although this
is primarily an assessment statute, it does provide that an owner who
successfully proves a taking in court may be awarded "reasonable at-
torney fees and expenses."'" The Kansas statute, however, does not
include any jurisdictional requirements for remedies or any particular
limitations on the use of information gathered for assessment
purposes.
LOUISIANA: Louisiana requires governmental entities to perform
impact assessments of actions that may affect the value of agricultural
land or forest land, which would include forestry activities. Govern-
ment entities must undertake such analysis before "taking any pro-
posed action that will likely result in a diminution. 2 32 In both cases,
copies of the assessments must be submitted to the Governor, the
Commissioner of Agriculture and Forestry, and any affected landown-
ers.233 To assist private agricultural property owners and state agen-
cies in their assessments to determine whether an action will likely
result in a diminution in value, the Commissioner of Agriculture and
224. Id. § 77-705.
225. Id. § 77-706.
226. Id. § 77-703(c).
227. Id. § 77-703(a).
228. Id. § 77-703(d).
229. Id. § 77-703(b)(1).
230. Id. § 77-703(b)(2).
231. Id. § 77-709.
232. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:3609(A) (West Supp. 1997) (agricultural land); id.
§ 3:3622.1(A) (forest land).
233. Id. § 3:3609(D) (agricultural land); id. § 3:3622.1(D) (forest land).
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Forestry must promulgate guidelines.3 It is not clear, however,
whether the guidelines must be available by any particular time. "Pri-
vate agricultural property" is "bona fide agricultural or horticultural
land" that is assessed as such for tax purposes, is owned by one or
more private citizens or legal entities, and is located outside of the
corporate limits of any municipality 35 "Forest land" is any land de-
voted to the growing of trees, or to the commercial production of tim-
ber, wood, or forest products that is located outside the corporate
limits of any municipality and is assessed as such for tax purposes.23
"Forest activities" are those that occur on forest land in association
with "reforesting, growing, managing, protecting, [or] harvesting."' 37
Though the statute does not use the word "taking" to refer to a dimi-
nution, agricultural land suffers a "diminution in value" when a "qual-
ified appraisal expert" determines that the land has experienced a
twenty percent or greater reduction in fair market value as result of
any governmental action.238 Similarly, a twenty percent or greater re-
duction in the fair market value of forest land "prohibits or limits" it
and the activities thereon.3 9 A "governmental action" includes an
"annexation of territory," the "issuance of a rule, regulation, policy, or
guideline promulgated for or by any governmental entity" or any "or-
der or other legally binding directive" which may be enforced by gov-
ernment.2 ° A "governmental entity" includes a "board, authority,
commission, department, office, or agency of the state government," a
"local governmental subdivision with a population of less than
425,000," and a "special purpose district."'2 4' In both cases, when
either a "diminution in value" occurs or when a governmental action
prohibits or limits the use of the land, Louisiana provides the owner
with a remedy process 242 that does not affect any other remedies or
rights that an owner "may have under any other provision of law,"
such as state or federal constitutional takings law. 24 3
MANE: Any state regulation must be reviewed by the Attorney
General,2' and "major substantive rules"-defined as those which
"[r]equire the exercise of significant agency discretion ' 2-11 or vill im-
pose major burdens, such as significant increases in the cost of doing
234. Id § 3:3609(E).
235. Id § 3:3602(15).
236. Id § 3:3622(2).
237. Id. § 3:3622(1).
238. Id. § 3:3602(11).
239. Id. § 3:3622(6).
240. Id. § 3:3602(12) (agricultural land); id. § 3:3622(3) (forest land).
241. Id § 3:3602(13) (agricultural land); id. § 3:3622(4) (forest land).
242. Id. § 3:3610 (agricultural land); id. § 3:3623 (forest land). The remedies avail-
able are further discussed in the Louisiana segment of part B of this Appendix.
243. Id. § 3:3612(A) (agricultural land); id. § 3:3624 (forest land).
244. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §8056(1)(A) (Vest 1989).
245. Id. § 8071(2)(B)(1) (Vest Supp. 1996).
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business or decreases in property values246-must be reviewed by the
legislature. 47 The Attorney General is prohibited from approving
any proposed regulation that is "reasonably expected to result in a
taking of private property under the Constitution of Maine"-there is
no mention of the federal Constitution-unless the act is required by
law or sufficient variance procedures are in place to avoid a taking.248
Similarly, the legislative review for rules expected to reduce property
values significantly must consider, among other items, whether suffi-
cient variance procedures exist to permit the avoidance of an uncon-
stitutional taking, as well as "whether, as a matter of policy, the
expected reduction is necessary or appropriate for the protection of
the public health, safety and welfare. 2 49 Neither "property" nor
"taking" is defined in the statute. Maine's remedial process is dis-
cussed infra in part B. 5°
MICHIGAN: Michigan's "Property Rights Preservation Act" applies
only to the state departments of Natural Resources, Environmental
Quality, and Transportation.2 1 The Attorney General, in conjunction
with these three departments, must develop and update annually "tak-
ings assessment guidelines" based on current state and federal law. 52
The departments must then use the guidelines to identify and evaluate
government actions which might result in a taking.253 "Property" is
not defined, but rather, a "constitutional taking" or a "taking" is de-
fined as "the taking of private property by government action such
that compensation" is required by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution or the Michigan Constitu-
tion.254 A "government action" includes a permit or license decision,
a rule which may limit the use of private property, or the enforcement
of such a rule.2 15 Because the statute addresses only the need for as-
sessment, it provides no specific remedies, jurisdictional requirements,
or limitations for aggrieved landowners. Also, the statute does not
place any explicit limits on the use of information gleaned through the
assessment process.
MIssouRI: If a proposed rule or regulation "limits or affects the use
of real property," the promulgating agency or department must con-
duct a takings analysis to determine whether, on its face, the proposed
rule constitutes a "taking of real property under relevant state and
246. Id. § 8071(2)(B)(2).
247. Id. § 8072.
248. H.P. 117-1188, 2nd Sess. § 6 (Me. 1996) (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5,
§ 8056(6) (West Supp. 1996)).
249. Id. § 8 (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 8072(4)(H) (West Supp. 1996)).
250. See infra notes 380-92 and accompanying text.
251. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 24.422(b) (West Supp. 1997).
252. Id. § 24.423.
253. Id. § 24.424.
254. Id. § 24.422(a).
255. Id. § 24.422(c).
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federal law." 6 Certification that the analysis was conducted must
then be submitted with the rule when it is given to the Secretary of
State for publication. 2 7 "Property" is not explicitly defined, but the
statute does refer specifically to "real property."'  The "taking of
private property" is defined as any activity that would give rise to a
right of compensation based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution or any applicable Missouri
state law provision.2-5 9 The governmental entities and actions to which
the statute applies are no further defined than as "rules" and "regula-
tions" promulgated by "departments" and "agencies." 26 Concerned
only with assessment, the statute provides neither specific remedies to
landowners nor jurisdictional requirements on takings claims. Addi-
tionally, the statute does not limit the use of information gathered in
the assessment process. As originally passed, Missouri's statute ex-
pired on September 1, 1997.261 In June 1997, however, a new law re-
moved the expiration provision completely.-2-
MONTANA: In 1995, the "Private Property Assessment Act"
charged the Attorney General with developing takings guidelines and
a checklist to be updated annually and provided to state agencies.2
As the basis for the guidelines and updates, the Attorney General was
to consider state and federal constitutional law and jurisprudence re-
garding the taking of private property. 4 State agencies are to use the
guidelines to evaluate agency actions and to prepare impact assess-
ments for proposed actions which implicate takings law. 265 The im-
pact assessment must then be submitted to the Governor before the
action can be taken.266 The statute defines "private property" as all
real property, including water rights. 67 Two separate definitions re-
lating to takings are included in this statute. "Taking or damaging" is
defined as a deprivation of private property giving rise to compensa-
tion under the federal or state constitution. 21 Also, an "action with
taking or damaging implications" includes proposed state agency ac-
tions "pertaining to land or water management or to some other envi-
ronmental matter that if adopted and enforced would constitute a
deprivation of private property in violation of the United States or
256. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.017 (West Supp. 1997).
257. Id
258. Id
259. It
260. Id.
261. S.B. 20-588, 2nd Sess. (Mo. 1994).
262. H. B. 89-88, 1st Sess. (Mo. 1997).
263. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-10-104(1) (1997).
264. Id § 2-10-104(2).
265. Id § 2-10-105(1)-(2).
266. Id § 2-10-105(3).
267. Id § 2-10-103(2).
268. Id § 2-10-103(4).
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Montana [C]onstitution[s]."I69 "State agency" is defined as "an of-
ficer, board, commission, department, or other entity within the exec-
utive branch of the state government." 170 An "action" is "a proposed
state agency administrative rule, policy, or permit condition or de-
nial." It should be noted that the term "action" excludes eminent do-
main proceedings, law enforcement forfeitures, or any reduction in
the regulation of private property.2 7' The statute places no limitations
on the information in the assessment, provides no specific remedy to
landowners, and places no jurisdictional requirements on landowners'
claims.
In addition to the mention of environmental matters in the "Private
Property Assessment Act," another 1995 law amended the "Montana
Environmental Policy Act" to include, as one of its policy aims, the
"protect[ion of] the right to use and enjoy private property free of
undue government regulation." 72 The amendments also direct all
agencies to evaluate the impact of proposed actions on private prop-
erty rights as part of the environmental impact statement2 73 and also
to consult with other agencies concerning any regulation of private
property that may result from a proposal.2 74 This statute does not de-
fine "private property" or "takings," does not provide remedies or im-
pose jurisdictional requirements, and does not place any special
limitation on the property-concerned information contained within
the environmental impact statement.
NORTH DAKOTA: If a state agency proposes a rule that may limit
the use of real property, the agency must prepare a written assessment
of takings implications.275 The assessment must address the likelihood
whether a taking will occur, the purpose, benefits, and costs of the
rule, and the potential sources of funds for compensation if such a
taking is determined.2 76 Any landowner whose property is or could
be affected by a rule may submit a written request asking that the
agency reconsider the rule.2 7 7 The agency, having considered the re-
quest, must respond to the landowner in writing within thirty days.278
The definition of "real property" referenced in the statute appears to
provide a bright-line definition encompassing land, fixtures, and ap-
purtenances 2 7 9 but it is ultimately undercut by the generalities de-
rived from judicial pronouncements. A "taking" is the taking of
269. Id. § 2-10-103(1).
270. Id. § 2-10-103(3).
271. Id. § 2-10-103(1).
272. Id. § 75-1-103(2)(d).
273. Id. § 75-1-201(1)(b)(iv)(D).
274. Id. § 75-1-201(1)(c).
275. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-02.5(1) (Supp. 1997).
276. Id.
277. Id. § 28-32-02.5(2).
278. Id.
279. Id. § 47-01-03 (1987).
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private real property by a government action that gives rise to com-
pensation pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution or the North Dakota Constitution. 28 If an
exercise of the state's police power or regulatory power diminishes the
value of property by more than fifty percent, the action constitutes a
"regulatory taking," unless the exercise of state power "substantially
advances legitimate state interests, does not deny an owner the eco-
nomically viable use of the owner's land, or is in accordance with ap-
plicable state or federal law."'" The involved governmental entities
are no further defined than state agencies, and their applicable actions
are "proposed rules."'  If a taking occurs after the assessment stage,
the statute does not provide any specific remedies or jurisdictional re-
quirements to make a claim. Additionally, there is no limitation
placed upon the use of the informatibn in the assessment.
TENNESSEE: Tennessee's Attorney General must establish and an-
nually update a set of guidelines, based on federal and state law, to
assist state agencies in identifying and analyzing actions that may re-
sult in a taking.' In addition, when reviewing rules that are in the
process of promulgation, the Attorney General is prohibited from ap-
proving any rule that would result in a taking.3 4 "Private property" is
defined as real property, and improvements thereon, which is not
owned by the state. 5 A "taking" or "unconstitutional taking" is a
governmental action that takes private property such that compensa-
tion is required by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution.286 The governmen-
tal entity to which the statute applies is not specifically defined; "state
agencies," however, are the only state entities mentioned in the stat-
ute. -' "Government action" is only defined to the extent that it does
not include the exercise of eminent domain, actions resulting from a
violation of the law, or the discontinuation of government actions.'
The statute of limitations for bringing an action on an unconstitutional
taking claim is twelve months from the occurrence of the taking or
from the time the owner has knowledge of the taking.2a9 Though no
jurisdictional limitations are placed on takings claims, a private prop-
erty owner who proves that a government action was an unconstitu-
tional taking is entitled to recover attorney's fees.291 Once the court
280. Id § 28-32-02.5(3) (Supp. 1997).
281. Id.
282. Id. § 28-32-02.5(1).
283. Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-1-203 (Supp. 1996).
284. Id.
285. Id. § 12-1-202(2).
286. Id § 12-1-202(3).
287. Id. § 12-1-201.
288. Id. § 12-1-202(1).
289. Id § 12-1-206; id § 29-16-124.
290. Id § 12-1-205.
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determines that the property has declined in value due to a taking, the
property taxes on the realty are reduced correspondingly.29' Tennes-
see does not even require a formal written assessment of takings im-
plications, and there is no limitation on the use of takings information
gathered by the state.
TExAs: Texas' Attorney General is required to develop and to up-
date annually guidelines to assist agencies in "identifying and evaluat-
ing [actions] that may result in a taking.''2 g The statute covers state
agencies and local governments. 93 A "taking" is an action that falls
in one of two categories. The first "taking" category includes govern-
ment actions affecting property that would require compensation
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution or the Texas Constitution.9 The second category covers
any government action that "restricts or limits the owner's right to the
property" and decreases the market value of the affected property by
at least 25 percent.295 The statute defines "private real property" as a
real property interest recognized by common law, including water
rights, which is not owned by the government.296 "Governmental en-
tity" is defined as "a board, commission, council, department, or other
agency in the executive branch of state government" or a "political
subdivision of this state. ' 297 A governmental entity contemplating an
action that may result in a taking must publish notice of the proposed
action in a newspaper in the county where affected property is lo-
cated. 9 ' In addition, the governmental entity must produce a "tak-
ings impact assessment," which becomes a public document,
evaluating the proposal in light of the Attorney General's guide-
lines.299 Failure to draft an assessment voids the government ac-
tion3 ° Texas' remedial process is discussed infra in part B of the
Appendix.30 '
UTAH: Utah created assessment requirements for state agencies
and local political subdivisions, but the provisions for each are not
identical. 3° Each state agency is required to develop and update an-
nually a set of guidelines which aids in determining whether a propo-
291. Id. § 12-1-204.
292. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2007.041 (West Supp. 1997).
293. Id. § 2007.002(1).
294. Id. § 2007.002(5)(A).
295. Id. § 2007.002(5)(B).
296. Id. § 2007.002(4).
297. Id. § 2007.002(1).
298. Id. § 2007.042. In addition, according to subsection (b)(2), state agencies must
publish a notice in the Texas Register.
299. Id. § 2007.043.
300. Id. § 2007.044.
301. See infra notes 389-395 and accompanying text.
302. 1994 Utah Laws 91 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-90-2 to -4 (Supp. 1996))
(state agencies); Utah Code Ann. § 63-90a-1 to -4 (Supp. 1996) (political sub-
divisions).
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sal will result in an unconstitutional taking.30 3 An agency must
complete a takings assessment of a proposed action, based on its
guidelines, and, if the assessment implicates takings issues, forward
the assessment to the Governor and the Legislative Management
Committee.3" "Private property" includes real or personal property
that is protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution. 5 A "constitu-
tional taking" or a "taking" is defined as a governmental action for
which compensation would be required by the state or federal consti-
tutions. 06 "Governmental actions" include any proposed or emer-
gency rules, licensing or permitting conditions, required dedications or
actions, or existing statutes or rules.307 "State agencies" are any of-
ficers or units of the state executive branch that have the legal power
to adopt rules.308 No specific remedies are provided for those land-
owners who suffer a taking by a state agency.
Local governmental entities are given a separate charge to develop
takings assessment guidelines, but theirs need only apply to cases af-
fecting private real property. 0 9 In addition to the guidelines, local
political subdivisions must establish their own review procedures for
actions implicating constitutional takings issues.310 Any affected land-
owner must appeal within thirty days after the regulatory decision is
issued, and the local entity must decide the appeal within fourteen
days thereafter.311 The definition of "constitutional taking issues" is
substantially identical to the definition of a "constitutional taking"
under the statute which applies at the state level.31 2 Neither the state
level statute nor the local level statute imposes any restrictions upon
the use of the information contained in the assessment. Also, neither
statute places particular jurisdictional requirements or limitations on
takings claims.
In 1997, the Utah legislature created the position of "Private Prop-
erty Ombudsman" within the Department of Natural Resources in or-
der to provide a central repository of takings knowledge for the
state.313 The person hired for the job is to have a background in tak-
ings law, develop and maintain an expertise in that area of the law,
assist state agencies in guideline development and takings implication
analysis, identify state and local actions that have potential takings
303. Utah Code Ann. § 63-90-3 (Supp. 1996).
304. Id § 63-90-4.
305. Id § 63-90-2(3).
306. Id. § 63-90-2(1).
307. Id. § 63-90-2(2).
308. Id. § 63-90-2(4).
309. Id. § 63-90a-1(1).
310. Id. § 63-90-4(1).
311. Id. § 63-90a-4.
312. Id § 63-90a-1(1).
313. 1997 Utah Laws 293 § 1 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-34-13 (LEXIS
through 1997 First Special Sess.)).
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implications, and advise private property owners and private citi-
zens.314 The Ombudsman may also mediate disputes between private
property owners and governmental entities, if one of the parties so
requests.315 The Private Property Ombudsman, however, may not
represent any of the parties, including the government in a court pro-
ceeding which deals with a takings dispute.316
VIRGINIA: In 1995, Virginia amended its Administrative Process
Act to require that the economic impact analysis of each proposed
regulation include "the impact of the regulation on the use and value
of private property. ' 317 No definitions of "private property" or "tak-
ing" or descriptions of the precise governmental entities to which the
assessment applied were included with the particular amendment.
There were also no specific remedies, jurisdictional requirements, or
limitations on the property-oriented information in the analysis.
In 1993, the Virginia Legislature established a joint subcommittee
to study governmental actions affecting private property rights.318
Though originally slated to issue its findings in 1994, the subcommit-
tee was extended in 1994319 and again in 1995 because it was deemed
"prudent for the joint subcommittee to continue its study of this
evolving area of law in order to evaluate how any changes may effect
[sic] private property rights in Virginia. ' 320 The committee's report
finally came out in 1997 with the conclusion that "it would be too
speculative to attempt to predict the actions of Congress with regard
to private property rights. '32 1 Therefore, the committee made no rec-
ommendations.322 One piece of property rights legislation died in
committee in 1996,323 and a House Joint Resolution calling for prop-
erty rights was not carried over when the legislature adjourned in June
1997.324
WASHINGTON: In 1991, Washington's Attorney General was re-
quired to create "an orderly, consistent process," possibly including a
checklist, by which state agencies and local governments would evalu-
ate proposed actions to determine if such actions resulted in an uncon-
314. Id. (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-34-13(3) (LEXIS through 1997 First Spe-
cial Sess.)).
315. Id. (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-34-13(3)(g) (LEXIS through 1997 First
Special Sess.)).
316. Id. (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 63-34-13(4) (LEXIS through 1997 First Spe-
cial Sess.)).
317. Va. Code Ann. § 9-6.14:7.1(G) (Michie Supp. 1997).
318. H.J. Res. 624, Va. G.A. Sess. (1993).
319. H.J. Res. 74, Va. G.A. Sess. (1994).
320. H.J. Res. 26, Va. G.A. Sess. (1995).
321. Final Report of the Joint Subcomm. Studying Governmental Actions Affecting
Private Property Rights, House Doc. No. 2, at 4 (Va. 1997).
322. Id. at 5.
323. H.B. 1210, Va. G.A. Sess. (1996).
324. H.J.R. 564, Va. G.A. Sess. (1997).
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stitutional taking.3 2-5 The Attorney General must review and annually
update the process to assure that it is consistent with current law. 6
The statute applies to state agencies and local governments with pro-
posed regulatory and administrative actions. Neither "property" nor
"taking" was defined in the statute. The evaluation process is pro-
tected by attorney-client privilege, and no private right of action is
available to force compliance with the section.3 27 Additionally, no ju-
risdictional requirements or limitations are imposed by the statute.
The legislature also passed the "Private Property Regulatory Fair-
ness Act" in 1995. The law stated that any "regulation of private
property or restraint of land use by a governmental entity" was pro-
hibited unless the entity made public its analysis of the proposal's "to-
tal economic impact in [sic] private property" at least thirty days in
advance.32 When any "portion or parcel of private property" was
"taken for general public use," which occurred any time a governmen-
tal entity regulated or imposed a land use restraint on the property for
any reason other than to avoid a public nuisance, the regulator was
required to compensate the property owner for the full reduction in
value.329 "Private property" included land, interests therein, improve-
ments thereon, water rights, and any harvestable or extractable re-
sources that were not owned by the government and were protected
by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Consti-
tution or the Washington Constitution.330 "Governmental entity" in-
cluded the state, its agencies, and any agencies or commissions fully or
partially funded by any political subdivision within the state.331 Due
to the statue's breadth and potential expense, however, the voters re-
pealed the "Private Property Regulatory Fairness Act" through "Ref-
erendum 48" in November of 1995.332
WEST VIRGINIA: The statute applies only to the West Virginia De-
partment of Environmental Protection. The department is required to
prepare an assessment of any proposed action "that is reasonably
likely to deprive a private real property owner of... property ... or
•.. of all productive use of his or her private real property, 333 but
only if the state or federal supreme court has required compensation
to be paid in a similar case.3M The statute also permits a court to
award attorney's fees to a private property owner if it finds that com-
325. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 36.70A.370(1), (2) (West Supp. 1997).
326. Id. § 36.70A.370(1).
327. Id. § 36.70A.370(4).
328. 1995 Wash. Laws 98 § 3.
329. Id. § 4.
330. Id. § 7(3).
331. Id. § 7(2).
332. See Grant Moos, Washington: Voters Reject Restrictive Property Rights Mea-
sure, 1995 WL 907146, Nov. 27, 1995.
333. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-1A-3(a) (1996).
334. Id. § 22-1A-3(a).
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pensation for a departmental action is required by the federal or state
constitution and finds that the department either failed to perform the
required assessment, or performed it but concluded that compensa-
tion was unnecessary. 335 No terms are defined in the statute.
WYOMING: The Attorney General is required to develop a check-
list and guidelines to assist state agencies in evaluating actions that
may result in an unconstitutional taking. 36 In addition to using the
guidelines to evaluate administrative actions, state agencies must also
make sure that any conditions imposed on the issuance of a permit
directly relate to, and substantially advance the purpose of the per-
mit.337 The statute defines "taking" as "an uncompensated taking of
private property in violation of the state or federal constitution." '338 It
also includes a definition of "constitutional implications": the taking
of property in violation of the federal or state constitution, as deter-
mined by the Attorney General based on current law.33 9 "Private
property" is property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitu-
tion.34 ° "Government agency" is defined as "the state of Wyoming
and any officer, agency, board, commission, department or similar
body of the executive branch of state government. '34 1 No mention is
made of the admissibility of the guidelines or evaluations if the land-
owner brings suit in court.
B. Statutes Creating a Compensation Scheme/Remedial Process for
Aggrieved Landowners
ARIZONA: Arizona established an administrative appeal process, 342
but it is limited to appeals of a "dedication or exaction" imposed as
part of the administrative approval of "the use, improvement or devel-
opment of real property. ' 343 None of the terms used in the statute are
defined specifically. The local government must designate a hearing
officer and notify the landowner of his nonwaivable right to appeal.344
335. Id. § 22-1A-5.
336. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-5-303 (Michie 1995).
337. Id. § 9-5-304.
338. Id. § 9-5-302(a)(v).
339. Id. § 9-5-302(a)(i).
340. Id. § 9-5-302(a)(iv).
341. Id. § 9-5-302(a)(ii).
342. The legislature enacted separate provisions with one imposing the appeal re-
quirement on cities and towns, and the other imposing the identical requirement on
counties. For ease of reference, the text will refer to the entities collectively as "local
governments" and the footnotes will cite to both statutory provisions.
343. H.B. 42-2229, 1st Sess. § I(A) (Ariz. 1995) (city) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 9-500.12(A) (West 1996)); id. § 2(A) (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 11-810(A) (West Supp. 1997)).
344. Id. § 1(A), (C) (city) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.12(A), (C)
(West 1996)); id. § 2(A), (C) (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-810(A),
(C) (West Supp. 1997)).
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Appeals must be filed within thirty days of the decision, heard within
thirty days of receipt, and decided within five days after the hear-
ing.'S The government entity bears the burden of showing that "an
essential nexus" exists between the exaction and "a legitimate govern-
mental interest"'  and that the proposal is "roughly proportional to
the impact of the proposed use." 7 Modification or deletion of the
exaction are the only available remedies and if the hearing officer
does not completely remove the exaction, the owner may appeal to
superior court for a trial de novo.348 The court may award damages
and attorney's fees in appropriate circumstances.3 9 Arizona's evalua-
tion and study requirements are discussed supra in part A.3
FLORIDA:35' Florida created a new cause of action, "separate and
distinct . .. from the law of takings, 352 for actions of government
entities that constitute an "inordinate burden" on private real prop-
erty interests. The covered governmental entities include agencies of
the state, regional and local governments, except those that exercise
power based on a formal delegation of authority from the federal gov-
ernment.3 13 "Real property" includes land and "any appurtenances
and improvements to the land."3" The definition of "inordinate bur-
den" is an amalgamation of classic phrases from the Supreme Court
takings cases. The Court has explained that a taking occurs when a
restriction of the use of real property renders an owner:
permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation for the existing use of the real property or a vested right
to a specific use ... or... is left with existing or vested uses that are
unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a dis-
345. Id. § 1(C), (D), (F) (city) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.12(C), (D),
(F) (West 1996)); id. § 2(C), (D), (F) (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § I1-
810(C), (D), (F) (West Supp. 1997)).
346. Id. § 1(E) (city) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.12(E) (West 1996));
id. § 2(E) (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-810(E) (West Supp. 1997)).
The "essential nexus" burden is derived from Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
347. Id. § 1(E) (city) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.12(E) (%Vest 1996));
id. §2(E) (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-810(E) (\Vest Supp. 1997)).
The "rough proportionality" burden is derived from Dolan v. City of 7igard, 504 U.S.
374, 384 (1994).
348. Id. § 1(G) (city) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.12(G) (1996)): id.
§ 2(G) (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-810(G) (\Vest Supp. 1997)).
349. Id. § I(H) (city) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.12(H) (1996)); id.
§ 2(H) (county) (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-810(H) (West Supp. 1997)).
350. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
351. For an detailed analysis of the Florida statute, see David L. Powell, et al., A
Measured Step to Protect Private Property Rights, 23 Fla. St. U. L Rev. 255 (1995).
352. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 70.001(1) (Vest Supp. 1997).
353. Id. § 70.001(3)(c).
354. Id. § 70.001(3)(g).
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proportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public
355
If a landowner believes she has been inordinately burdened, she
must file an administrative complaint to the agency responsible for
imposing the burden before she can go to court. The complaint must
include an appraisal showing the diminution in her property's value. 356
The owner and the agency then have 180 days in which to negotiate,
and the agency must begin by making a written settlement offer,
which can offer modifications to the owner's proposed development
or the agency's original decision, or can simply stand pat.357 If the
agency chooses not to change its original action, or if the owner rejects
the agency's settlement offer, the agency must issue the owner a writ-
ten "ripeness decision," describing all the lawful uses to which the
property may be put. The statute explicitly describes the ripeness de-
cision as "the last prerequisite to judicial review. "358 If the owner is
dissatisfied with the settlement offer and the ripeness decision, she
may file a compensation claim in the circuit court where the affected
property is located.359 The court is required to consider the agency's
settlement offer and ripeness decision in determining whether or not
the owner was inordinately burdened. 6 ° If the owner wins and the
court decides the agency did not make a bona fide settlement offer,
the owner may recover attorney's fees and costs; 361 if the court, how-
ever, determines that the owner rejected a bona fide settlement that
offered a fair resolution, she could be ordered to pay the agency's fees
and costs. 36
2
IDAHO: In addition to its takings assessment requirements, 363 Idaho
provides two remedies for a landowner affected by a local planning or
zoning decision.3 64 Any person with an interest in real property
"which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial" of a de-
velopmental permit may petition the decisionmaking body to hold a
355. Id. § 70.001(3)(e). The concept of "distinct investment-backed expectations"
first appeared in Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1977), but
the Court never really attempted to explain fully its meaning. See Daniel R.
Mandelker, Land Use Law §§ 2.13, 2.18 (3d ed. 1993). The unfairness of asking an
individual to bear a disproportionate share of the burden was most recently noted in
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994).
356. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 70.001(4)(a) (West Supp. 1996).
357. Id. § 70.001(4)(c).
358. Id. § 70.001(5)(a).
359. Id. § 70.001(5)(b).
360. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
361. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)(1).
362. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)(2).
363. The assessment requirements were discussed in the Idaho segment of part A
of this Appendix.
364. 1997 Idaho Sess. Laws 199 does not explicitly state that the law applies only to
local governments. The bill amends the zoning/planning provisions of the Idaho
Code, however, and those provisions do not apply to state agencies. Idaho Code § 67-
6503 (1989).
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hearing regarding that permit, if no hearing has yet been held.365 Af-
ter the governing body makes its decision and within twenty-eight
days after all remedies provided for in the local ordinance have been
exhausted, an injured property owner may seek judicial review.?" Al-
ternatively, if the property owner wishes to claim "'just compensation'
for a perceived 'taking,""'67 based on the premise that the decision on
the permit was actually a regulatory action tantamount to eminent do-
main, the owner may bypass the petition for a hearing and institute an
inverse condemnation action.368
LoUISIAA: If an owner of "private agricultural property" believes
that a twenty percent or greater diminution in the fair market value of
that land has occurred, the landowner may bring suit against the gov-
ernmental entity whose action caused such a precipitous decline.3 69 In
the case of agricultural land, which is used and assessed as such,370 the
owner may bring suit in a state court with jurisdiction over the prop-
erty "to determine whether the governmental action caused a diminu-
tion in value."'371 The agricultural property owner, however, has the
burden of showing that the diminution is not a result of a use that had
been previously prohibited 7.3 2 Also the agricultural landowner and
governmental entity are encouraged to seek mediation and may in the
end be required to engage in such a process by the court.3" A pre-
vailing agricultural landowner may be awarded costs and attorney's
fees and may either take the value of the diminution and keep title or
may take the full fair market value of the land before diminution oc-
curred and transfer title to the governmental entity.374 If the agricul-
tural landowner wins and the governmental entity rescinds or repeals
the diminution-causing rule as a result of the court's decision, the gov-
ernment remains liable only for damages caused by the application of
the rule.375 The remedy available to owners of forest land is more
limited than that available to agricultural landowners.376 Owners of
forest land have a cause of action in district court against the govern-
mental entity for damages only.3 " In other words, the forest land-
365. Id. § 67-6521(1)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1997).
366. Id. § 67-6521(1)(d).
367. Id- § 67-6521(2)(b). "Just compensation" and "taking" are in quotation marks
in the statute, but are not defined either explicitly or by reference.
368. Id.
369. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3:3610 (West Supp. 1997) (agricultural land); id. § 3:3623
(forest land). Louisiana's takings assessment requirements and the definitions of
terms used in the statute are discussed in the Louisiana segment of part A of this
Appendix.
370. Id § 3:3602(15).
371. Id. § 3:3610(A)-(B).
372. Id. § 3:3610(A).
373. Id. § 3:3610(C).
374. Id. § 3:3610(D)-(E).
375. Id § 3:3610(F).
376. Id. § 3:3623.
377. Id. § 3:3623(A)-(B).
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owner can recover costs, attorney's fees, and "a sum equal to the
diminution in value," but must retain title and is not entitled to have
the government buy the land outright.378 "[S]ubsequent repeal or re-
scission by the governmental entity" does not preclude the owner
from recovering all of the court's award.379
MAINE: Maine established a voluntary mediation program380 for
landowners who have "suffered significant harm as a result of a gov-
ernmental action regulating land use."'3 8 1 State agencies are required,
when requested, to participate in the mediation program382 while mu-
nicipalities are not.383 The landowner may not seek mediation until
he has exhausted administrative avenues. To reach mediation, the
landowner must have either (1) "sought and failed to obtain a permit,
variance or special exception and has pursued all reasonable avenues
of [an] administrative appeal" in a municipal action or (2) in a state
action, "sought and failed to obtain governmental approval for [such]
land use" by the property owner and has a right to judicial review
based on final agency action or failure to act.38 There is no specific
remedy set forth in the statute; the purpose of mediation is to facili-
tate "a mutually acceptable solution. '385 Commencement of media-
tion tolls any filing deadline for judicial review of the disputed
governmental action.386 Statements made during mediation are ad-
missible in court as allowed by the Maine Rules of Evidence. 387
Maine's assessment requirements are discussed supra in part A of the
Appendix.388
TEXAS: In addition to imposing evaluation and assessment require-
ments, Texas created a right of action for landowners who were vic-
tims of a taking by state or local government.389 The provisions of the
statute are not exclusive, the remedies provided are available "in addi-
tion to other procedures or remedies provided by law. ' 390 The land-
378. Id. § 3:3623(C)-(D).
379. Id. § 3:3623(E).
380. H.P. 117-1188, 2nd Sess. § 5(14) (Me. 1996) (codified at 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 5, § 3341(3) (West Supp. 1996). It might be more accurate to call it a temporary
voluntary mediation program. The statute repeals the program on October 1, 2001.
Id. (codified at 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(14) (West Supp. 1996)).
381. Id. § 5(3)(A) (1996) (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(3) (West
Supp. 1996)).
382. Id. § 1 (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 8 (West Supp. 1996)).
383. Id. § 5(8) (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(8) (West Supp. 1996)).
384. Id. § 5(3)(C)(1)-(2) (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(3)(C)(1)-(2)
(West Supp. 1996)).
385. Id. § 5(6) (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(6) (West Supp. 1996)).
386. Id. § 5(5) (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(5) (West Supp. 1996)).
387. Id. § 5(10) (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 3341(10) (West Supp.
1996)).
388. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
389. For the statutory definition and discussion of the assessment requirements, see
supra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
390. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2007.006(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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owner may file suit against a local government entity in district court
in the county where the affected property is located, but the property
owner must file within 180 days of the date he knew or should have
known of the adverse impact on his property.39' If a state agency is
the defendant, the owner must fie a contested case with the state
agency within the same 180 day time limit.39 2 The sole remedy for a
taking is invalidation of the governmental action; 393 however, the
court is required to calculate damages from the taking, and the gov-
eminent may elect to pay the damages in lieu of invalidation. 31 The
prevailing party, whether the landowner or the government, is entitled
to attorney's fees and costs.3 95
391. Id. § 2007.021.
392. Id. § 2007.022(a)-(b). The complainant is entitled to a de novo appeal of the
agency's decision in the district court. Id. § 2007.025(b).
393. Id. § 2007.023(b).
394. Id. § 2007.024(b)-(c). Subsection (e) provides that if the government fails to
pay the damages within thirty days after the entry of the final order, the court shall
reinstate its order rescinding the governmental action. Id. § 2007.024(e)
395. Id. § 2007.026.
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